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Introductory 
Genesis of the Treatise. 
We have in the collection of Tibetan Tcipitaka Tangyur five 
works attributed to Bhadanta SUbhagupta in the following 
order: (I) Sarvajnasiddhikarika, (2) Bahyarthasiddhi Karika 
(3) Srutipariksa, (4) Anyapoha-vicara, (5) Iswarabh::lI1gakarika. Of 
these the second, viz. Bahyarthasiddhi, Tib. phyi.rol.gyi.don.grub, 
pa is the most valuable and interesting. It consists of about 
190 verses (anus/lip) coun ted for convenience into 188 verses. 
The purpose of the treatise, as its title implies, to refute the Y ogaca-
ra idealistic philosophy and to prove the reality of the external 
universe from the standpoint of the Sarvastivadi-Vaibhasikas. 
Vasubandhu, for example, in his Vimsatika elaborated a good deal 
to demonstrate the impossibility of atomic theory of the Vaisesikas. 
Dignaga again in his Alambanapariksa confirmed Vasubhandhu's 
opinion on the basis of his 10gicai and epistemological foundations. 
Next the upholder of the Idealistic School of Buddhism was 
Dharmakirti who embarked on the task of establishing his 
philosophy of absolute Idealism by enumerating several logical 
arguments. Of those, the argument of Sahopalambha-niyama, 
concomittance of co-cognition is most powerful and proverbial 
with all the posterior writers of Indian philosophy. Now the 
uphill task of reviewing all the arguments set up by the 
above masters of Idealism rests with Bhadanta Subhagupta, a 
renowned master of the Vaibhasika school of Buddhism. Subhagupta, 
in the present treatise takes up to examine in detail all the 
points raised in favour of Idealism and succeeds in presenting 
his case, the case of the Vaibhasika masters (on the subject) so bril-
liantly and vehemently that still later some masters, like Santaraksita 
and Kamalasila could not remain without making another attempt 
to vindicate their own positions in opposition to SUbhagupta's 
premise. In course of their examination into Externalism 
(Bahirarthapariksa) they quote Subhagupta's passages verbatim 
and refute his argument'> one by one. Thus we have about 
11 verses of SUbhagupta cited all of which are traced in the 
present treatise (see verses Nos. 29,35,44,66,68,71, 81, 87, 89, 
95, 101). Kamalasila cites also some prose passages (v. Panjika, 
p. 574, 20) from Subhagupta giving rise to a surmise that 
SUbhagupta might have also written some commentary on the 
treatise which is not translated into Tibetan. 
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This appraisal of the treatise may gIve a fair idea of 
when the author SUbhagupta must have flourished. His time 
must be fixed between Dharmakirti (650 A. D.) and Santaraksita-
Kamalasila (700-50 A. D.). He must be also anterior to Akalanka, 
a Jain author (c.700A. D.) since the latter quotes the former in his 
Nyayaviniscaya the ver: saha-sabdasca 'oke'smin, etc. (Bahyartha, 
ver. 71). We may therefore place him during 650-700 A. D. 
(Cf. T. Sangraha, Intro. XXXIV). 
REVIEW OF TOPICS 
Now let us make a brief survey of the whole contents 
of the treatise. One of the most powerful arguments in favour 
of Idealism is the example of dream experiences Subhagupta 
refutes it by pointing our differences between the wake experienc~s 
which are never contradict€ld and the dreams which are always 
contradicted. To the contention of the Y ogacara that all our 
knowledge and experience are illusive, the author replies that 
some knowledge may err on account of some defect in our 
cognitive apparatus but to say that it errs even in the absence 
of such defects creates an absolute darkness in the universe (v. 
ver. 31 with note). 
Dignaga holds that because eac~ atom is not separate ly 
cognized there could be no atoms at all; the au~hor points out in 
reply that the reason, i e. non-cognition of atoms in isolation 
(ekaika-aparicchede) is not conclusive; mind and mental phenomena, 
though not separately experienced, exist (v. ver. 33, 34). He 
maintains further that atoms cannot appear in life in isolation; 
when they appear in association with others they loose their 
atomic characteristics; how, then, could each of the atoms be 
reflected in our conciousness ?-he asks (ver. 43). On an external 
material object which is constituted of several atoms, we have 
an idea of 'one' but this idea of oneness is illusive and is produced 
as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous 
atoms (ver. 35) and that is our mental construction (6). The 
atoms being coagulated into an integrated form discharge a 
uniform action and therefore they cannot be designated as non-
substances (40). 
Vasubandhu's criticism of atomic theory on the basis of spacial 
distinction (digbhagabheda) which contradicts the theory itself is 
not at al1 reasonable; for we hold that there is no space apart 
from the atoms themselves. When we talk of space we mean 
the atoms themselves spread in certain fashion (45-46). The:: 
conception of one whole (avayavin) is also illogical. If you 
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consider it possible as a result of the atoms being closely knit 
together in a large number, you may better also conceive one 
time-unit on the moments that are preceeding and succeeding 
in an uninterrupted succession (50). Atoms have a peculiar 
relationship amongst themselves due to which no intruder could 
enter in the midst of atoms; by virtue of the same relationship 
the covering of atoms by other atoms has been upheld and 
therefore there i;; not any reason to presume the atoms have 
parts (52). The atoms, though mutually unrelated and partless 
become collocated and accomplish the gross things like the globe 
of earth, etc. on account of some excellence of mutual efficiency 
(anugrahal'isesa) (56-57). Certain number of atom~ alone enter 
into combination by virtue of that substance-efficiency (dral'ya-
sakti) but there are many others which could not do so on 
account of their meagre power (58-59), The atoms could be 
counted by some spritually advanced saints alone and therefore 
conceive them to be existing even though we do not cognize 
them. (65). 
Next th~ author taking up to examine the maxim of Sahopal-
ambhaniyama remarks that the knowledge is only cognizer 
and that too is only in the presence of some visible object 
and therefore they are cognized simultaneously but this fact does 
not testify their identity (67). Then the said hetu, reason has 
been pointed out to be defectiv·~ in several respects; sometimes 
it is indefinite, sometimes contradictory and sometimes unproved 
and so on. The term saha 'together' always implies a companion 
and if there is really Saha-vedana, 'together-cognition', the 
reason will obviously prove the contrary to what is cherished. 
The object feIt by sume other person in his own mind cannot 
be denied by us because it is far removed from our cognizance. 
The meaning of Sahavedana, according to the author is that 
when the knowledge-factors, sense-organ, etc. being present pre-
viously produce the sensuous consciousness in the next moment, 
then it may be termed Saha-ved.:ma (82). Speaking truly, the 
knowledge is not at an cognized, but it is said to be cognized 
figuritively since it cognizes its object by the law of nature. 
But the object is indeed cognized since it gives rise to its 
knowledge (85). To the question: How a kno,,'1edge cognizes, 
the author replies: the knowledge functions as if it measures 
the external thing (90-92). 
We have to take note here that the author does not plead, 
as the Sautrantika does, that the knowledge cognizes through the 
process of asuming the image of its object. Therefore he says: 
The image which you presume as existent in the object-
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knowledge truly exists in the external things alone and not in 
the knowledge (96). This image-theory is not favoured by the 
advocates of Citfamatrata, Idea·alone in the ultimate plane of 
existence. The point becomes evident from the following statement 
of the author: "You plead that the knowledge which, in fact, 
is imageless experiences its unreal images. I, likewise, advocate 
that the imageless knowledge experiences real things (102). He 
makes his position further clear by saying that the conscious-
ness which is imageless and formless comprehends (paricchid) 
through the agency of material sense-organs like the eye, etc. 
(I05). The author turns the image theory as an unfavourable 
proposition to the opponent thus: 
When a consciousness-form is accepted to be shaped 
by the form of an object, how does it mean that the 
consciousness c(lmprehends it? (90). \\ hen we maintain that 
consciousness flashes up in the presence of its object, your 
query as to how it does so is an irrelevant question (91). 
The consciousness is not creator of its object; nevertheless 
people on its simple awareness of its content, attribute to 
it a creative function (92). The author's realistic outlook is 
quite obvious in his solemn declaration that the process of 
cognizing the external things is the same with the saints 
as with the worldlings, with this much difference that the 
former is characterized by his detached and comprehensive vision 
(Sarvakara dhiya) whereas the latter by covetous observation of 
things (94). Immediately after this assertion however, the author 
concedes a special privilege to Buddha whose power of know-
ledge cannot be interrogated whether it comprehends simul-
taneously or in succession and whether it assumes the image of 
the object or does not (95). lhis opinion may not be shared 
by the Saut,rantika who is not in favour of aUowing any ex-
ception to the general law of knowledge operating always in a 
gradual process. Note Vasubandhu's clear~cllt exposition of this 
law: Santanena samarfhatvat yatha' gnih sarva~hhug mathJTatha 
sarvavid estavyo na sakrt sarva-vedanatJKosakarika, IX, 1. 
The Kramavedana is also the opinion of Harivarman.- Satya-
siddhi, Chaps 75, 76, etc. Cpo Pancavastuka-Vibhasa, p. 27 (Visva-
Bharati Annals, X). 
It is interesting to note that the well known lamp example 
cited in favour of SV.l-samved7na theory has been turned by 
the author to his advantage thus: As you hold that the lamp 
illumines itself as well as others, just so I hold that a knowledge 
illumines the selves of two or more alambanas of the same kind 
(106). Therefore according to Subh:lgupta, the visual conscious-
ness, e. g. can comprehend simultaneously several visible things 
falling within its range; thus our cog,lition of several colours 
in a carpet (citrastarana) is quite reasonable. 
The Yogacara maintains that knowledge cognizes its own 
aspect as its objects and hence what is cognizable (grahya) is 
only a part of knowledge. On this point the author remarks 
that the Tathlg1Lt's sJ.yings like everything is impermanent, etc. 
do not at all disclose that things meant there are the aspects 
of consciousness itself (104). SJme doctors rnaintain that a 
knowledge of previous moment serves as the object-cause of the 
next following knowledge; this view is not acceptable to the 
author; for, no knowledge necessarily follows immediately after 
another knowledge (118-119). Some other doctors consider that 
some force (sakti) productive of knowledge is regarded as the 
object-cause; this too is not appropriate for the reason that not 
any Sakti is experienced in our sensuous consciousness (120-21). 
It has been stated finally on the authority of the world and 
scripture that the external things alone are reasonable to be upheld 
as the object-cause of our cognitive experiences (123-24). The 
author further states that the external things are established not 
merely on account of their simple efficiency in their presence 
but also on account of such efficiency being experienced even 
in the case of their mistaken knowledge (viparyaya-jnana) (129-
.11); that is to say, when we mistake a snake for rope and 
tread upon it we are at once startled by its reaction. 
According to this author the knowledge of the discerner of 
other's thought is not untrue but it is quite natural. The 
others mind. could be comprehended just as any other external 
things are comprehended, The grasping of an object by our 
mind is not an act of running towards its objects, but simply 
an act of measuring (pariccheda). The Buddha is omniscient 
because he comprehends the entire universe through the agency 
of his cognizing knowledge (147-48). In the absence of external 
things none can become omniscient (150). The author has not 
accepted what Dignaga states in regard to an indescribable 
form of the object being cognized in the first moment (149-49). 
Nor does he sub"cribe his opinion to Dignaga's theory of 
construction-free mind in the first moment. (115). Dignaga's 
theory of Svasamvedana, introspection is also not favoured by this 
author, who constantly maintains that knowledge is always a cogni-
zing agent and never becomes cognized. The theory of intro-cogni-
lton is generally believed to haye been propounded by the 
Sautrantikas on the strength of memory of the knowledge in a later 
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periol (v. Madh. Avatara VI, ad. 7"2 Tib. p. 167, my Skt. 
text p. 60) and to have been followed by Dignaga and his 
followers (v. Pramanas. I; II). Subhagupta though not in favour 
of Svas:ul1vedana explains the memory as merely a mind directed 
towards lhc past thing; therefore it is not a cognition (graha) 
since it does not flash up from its cause (145-48). The 
Vaibhasika is not only the school that refuses to certify 
Sv:.zsamvedana, the Madhyamika too does the same. The memory 
however is possible, says the Madhyamika, since the consciousness 
as a cognizer is related to the past thing (Bodhicar. panjika. p. 
401, 16). 
The author further points out some more flaws in the 
system of the Y ogacaras. When we assume some entity existing 
externally then alone the contemplation upon it as no-soul 
becomes possible; but no such contemplation is possible in the 
case of ldealism (159,. The Buddahood which is according to 
you, completely an inactive state can be secured without making 
any efforts (161). The person who conceives the charity, etc. as 
mere thoughts is not able to release any person from poverty 
even by repeated practice of the charity-mind (168). Thcs'= are 
some of the objections that are levelled against Idealism; and 
1herefore the scriptural passages which speak of citfamatrata 
must not be interpreted quite literally. Their interpretations, accor-
ding to Subhagupta are as follows: The Buddha has declared 
(cittamatralal with reference 10 the imaginary 8spects of the 
external things but that does not at all imply that the external 
things are absolutely non-existent (179). Likewise the doctrine 
of no-soul has been preached with referenc~ to the imaginary 
aspect of things in order to remove aU the passions in the 
mind ot worldlings addicted to sexual pleasures (I 80), It has 
also been stated in some place that the external things do not 
exist in such forms as the ordimlfY worldings ent~r1ain in 
thei r mind (181). 
In flne the author sums up his constructive conclusion of 
his system as follows: There is something inferred (ka/pita), 
something fancied (vikalpita) and Dharmata. The inferred (ka/pita) 
is nothing but bhava, some basic entity, atoms; the fancied is 
diversity of the former (like the earth, etc.) and Dharmata final1y 
is the self-substance (Svalaksana). Of these three the author 
probably views the first and the last as real and the second, 
i.e. Vika/pita as unreal. This explanation may quite accord with 
the opinions of the Vaibhasikas. 
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Text nnd Translation 
The Tibetan text that i~ presented in the following pages 
is based on Bstan hgyur collection of the Tibetan Tripitaka 
preserved in our Visva-Bharati Library (Narthang edition) and 
then it was collated with the same in Peking Edn. recently 
printed in Japan and preserved in the Library of the Sahitya 
Akademy, New Delhi. Different readings are all noted in the 
foot-notes to the Tibetan text. 
The Tibetan text has been preceded by its English translations 
with copious annotative foot-notes supplying all the available 
references and informations on the topics discussed in the text. 
A tentative rendering into Sanskrit of each verse of the treatise 
has also been provided in the foot-notes with a view to making 
the trend of discussion more understandable to the readers who 
may be familiar with Indian philosophical texts and their styles. 
Indian (Sastraic) texts are generally not very easy to interpret 
without having recourse to some commentary. The present 
text being not provided with any commentary, the task of interpre-
ting it properly has become much tough. T have, however, 
endeavoured to understand the text with the sole aid of my 
limited experiences and studies in Buddhism and its philosophy. 
My Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary contains only those words that are 
found in the original Sanskrit verses arranged in a separate 
page 9. My thanks are due to Geshe Byam pa thsul khrim, 
a Tibetan refugee Lama working in the Visvabharati for supplying 
me with a transcript of the Tibetan text included in this pUblication. 
N. A. Sastri. 
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The original Sanskrit verses of the Bahyartha Siddhi 
identified so far 
~'hnQl';:~ ~ ~fTelt ll<:'f ~T.,~Cfrf~ ~T'e'FP:r I 
~ ~ 
fCf~rnTllrfCf~;'iFCfTa:, ~<f ~qCf~'<illa- II ~ '<. I' 
ffi'llTtr~&1OTTFqT~<:'f ll2:fT f"R'lJ~Cf)'i{I1: I 
'" " 3lfCff:;:;~~"i"rcrlll~ ~T<:t .,rffi'Cf)'i{li: Ii ~Y,. II 
SnltCfiq-~+rTUFrt ~CfTa;:citrrrF~~+lcr: I 
3lalsfq- q-{ml1["Tit~"fiTllfCf'lim.,t:f I' W I i 
'" ' 
<Wlltsfra t,H~CfiT ~Rra: '9T&I~~4fcr.n I 
3lCf?tl ~~~fCff~"T~ "T~Cff~: II ~ ~ II 
~CfiCfiT~fcr2Mm: ~~~~~~T I 
f'9~~?tl ~af~ ~~CfiWaCfil '1'9 Ii ~t:; It 
'" 
~~~<iX{"?<T ~T~sfhr.I. ofCfFlt., f~'1T lfif'if<:'f, I 
f~lsti Cfat ~i:f?lf~Cf ~~~"ll II \3~ II 
1J.~cr ~ mm:rr ~A fCft:P:.t~l1fl{ I 
m~t*q<ftL ~(lTq itrr Hnq ii1~'1+J.: II t:; <t (I 
~T<fip:m'1'1&l 'if Cff'Jrl1T~ ~ I 
CRm'it~ 'if ~~Teit fij"~T\:li1aT 'Ii~ II =13 II 
Cfi~ a~QCf. q:;:;~q Cf\q-f~~~~~l1[lll 
fCf~ a-rr '1T~~T Cfi~ ~ f~ Cff~fa II t:;'Z, II 
~TlfiR qr f.HTOfiT{ Cf~llCfiT~1fll~'ll' , 
" ",'"" ~Cf 6fT~sfq- fCf~T~ f~ 1: fq~ >lCf~a- II '<.Y,. 11 
llqT f~ +J<fCfT ~R f~TOfi~ wera: I 





Establishment of Objective Reality 
1. One1 who fulfilled in every aspect all duties beneficial to 
his own person (SFarlha) as well as duties beneficial to other 
living 2beings; to Him I salute in order to achieve the success 
(artha-siddhi) and demonstrate the truth of the objective universe. 
2. (The Idealist says:) The3 external thing that serves as 
the object of consciousness in the person of perfect eyesight 
does not exist (as real); (Reason); because it is a (mere) idea 
and because the idea manifests itself as external thing, (example;) 
just like a dream-thought and the double-moon idea.4 
3. Thus 5 the advocate of Idealism (theory of mind alone) 
proves the, non-existence of the external thing. Now, we at the 
outset prove that the external things on the basis of experience 
never contradicted6 in our daily life (avisamvadadrsti). 
4. The alternative prosposition that either the object-cause 
(alambana) is unreal because its knowledge is contradicted in our 
daily experience, or it is so, because the material and other 
things arc not fit to exist, is, both unsatisfactory. 
5. Ones experiences in dream one's own body chopped up 
into pieces; but this act of chopping is utterly unreal. If externalism 
is untrue in dream, does it apply to the waking stage? 
6. Ifs you mean (lit. desire) that the beheading'O of a waking 
person and his bodily exuberance resemble' a dream experience, 
why are you then so much care-laden about your gain and loss. 
7. Ifl! you say that every human activity is guided by 
illusion; but there is no perversion!2 in naming things. A knowledge 
which is non-illusive is naver contradicted. What is contradicted 
is always illusive. 
8. A knowledge13 of a material thing which differs from 
neither space'4 nor time is never contradicted; hence it is non-illu-
sive (abh ran tu). This alone is the characteristic of non-illusive 
knowledge and nothing else. 
9-lOa. The!S person who comprehends the extremely long 
things as well as the extremely small things is distinguished as 
the Saint!S (Yogin). (In case of absolute denial of external things) 
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the Buddhist Saint would not be omniscient and not g;et double 
sided release17 (ubhayatobhaga-vimukti) and thus Buddhahood 
would also be contradicted. 
10. b-d. (The Idealist continues:)18 Even our truly appre-
hension (ycdhavatpratiti) that every thing exists absolutely resembles 
the experience of things in dream. 
Now, why does it not become possibly contradicted (as a 
dreamy thing does)? 
11. tfl9 (things exist) on account of deep-rooted impressions 
(vasana), why are not the dreamy things also explained (In the 
like manner?) Hence the cognizable things like village and garden, 
etc. are true and become visible. 
12. The20 mere thought bereft of sense-data and its impression 
(vasana) are all momentary; (thus) the gain of their resultant 
fruits is interrupted. (Therefore) the sense-data (be admitted) as the 
stable causes of 2lfruition. 
13. For22 him who opines that the knowledge of one23 taste 
does not at all arise from any sense-datum, the nature of that 
knowledge (we ask) is whether permanent or impermanent. 
14. Ip4 it is similar to a dream (lit. sleep) will it not produce 
its resultant fruit? The cause of fruition (vipaka) being present, 
the destruction of fruition is improper. 
15. Just25 as som~1.hing seen by a sleepy person in his 
dream does not appear the sam;:: in the next moment, and hence 
b3comes imp:'!rm':lnent; likewise the destruction of the matured 
fruition is possible. 
16. In26 who"e opinion the sense-data are non-existent and 
hence th;::re is no occasion (lit. cause) for preaching. (for him) 
the fruition will repeat endless even after its destruction.27 
17. Why28 do you view that a man does a religious action 
by virtue of his deep-rooted impressions (vasana) of non-con-
tradiction ? If you say: because the material and other external 
things are unfit to be real, to this point we shall reply (later on). 
18. If 29 non-contradiction in the waking state persists on 
account of the maturation of asr:Jya ( = Alayavijnana) why is it 
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not (1ike this) that as long as there is eye-disese (tim ira) as 
basis (asraya), so long there is non-contradiction30 ? 
19. Suppose31 the Yogacarin acts (pravrtti) on the notion 
of mind alone (Cittamatrata) and on the presumption of the 
all alambana31A as false; when in the interval the notion of 
Cittamatrata is absent, even then the act is not contradicted 
(avisamvada) and therefore the act is not caused by that notion. 
20. The32 Sakti matured (paripaka) for aropa, assumption is. 
produced from some other external thing and not from ihe self33 
just like the sesame seed produced is from its flower. 
21. And34 the seed from the water, etc. What is produced 
from a cause, that product is similar to its cause, No va.sana35 is 
to be assumed on account of the genesis of the fruit as one 
infers the fire at the sight of the smoke. 
22. Things36 are made fragrant on account of an act praduced 
from some other thing; for example, the sesame seed becomes 
fragrant on its contact with the Jati37 flowers. 
23. Here38 the seven kinds of consciousness are produced 
from their upadana consciousness and their seeds being previously 
imputed there and dormant become matured into such consciousness 
under favourable conditions. 
24. Therefore39 the theory of vasana needs not to be assumed 
(as the Idealist does) on the presumption that no entity is 
produced from another entity, declare the advocates of Sakti,40 
25. Nevertheless,41 if you say: the knowledge of adhigama 
(rtogs.pa), definite perceptual experiences arises of its own accord 
(svatantratah) and this my opinion may be compared with the 
fact of the seed42 which being sowed matures of itself. 
26. This43 opinion too is not acceptable. Again your plea 
that its dependence on its upadana consciousness is common 
to us both, is not valid as it iHcurs a logical fallacy of mutual 
reliance (anyonyasraya).44 
27.-28a. This45 defect is absent in the system46 which holds 
that Saktis that are imputed (aropita) by the knowledge produced 
by the sensuous objects get nourished and matured into seven 
kinds of sensuous consciousness by dint of some Visesa, excel-
lence of favourable conditions, like the object, time, individual, etc. 
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28 b-d. But47 there is a system48 of thought which maintains 
that there is not any cause (of our objective experiences) other 
than the knowh3dge itself named upadan:l ( Alaya-vijnana) and 
this is quite irrelevant. 
29. When49 the proposition of Cittamatrata that is to he esta-
blished the proof or argument (sadhana) is the knowledge 
itself (Jnanatva); this proof is non-contradictory to any heterogeneous 
case (vijatiya) and therefore the said proposition is declared to 
be sesavatSO (i. e. sesavad-anumana). 
30. AS! close scrutiny (legs-dpyad) joyfulness (dJ!,ah mgur) 
engagement (pravrtti) gain of the good and rejection of the 
had; all these activities of the wake-up person never exist in dream. 
31. Certains:! sensuous knowledge errors on account of some 
impediment (-this is possible). But to say that even in the 
absence of an impediment there is an errorS3 creates an absolute 
darkness in the unjverse. 
ATOMIC THEORY PROVED. 
32. OthersS4 say: Everything is nothing but consciousness; 
the notion that there is an external object (corresponding 
to the sensuous consciousness) is ~ mental illusion. The knowable 
(object) is what is produced internally from one's own mind 
but it is not a visible object (rupa) (existing externally outside 
of the mind55). 
33a-c. The56 proposition that there exists no object is to 
be maintained (samsadhya); because each atom is not separately 
cognized, atoms do not appear in knowledgeS7 :-So says Dinnaga. 
33d-34. (Hetu-Reason)S8 would become doubtful (sat/digh-
dha) when it is applied to Citta and Caitta, mind and mental-
phenomena. 
lust like momentary things are not coenized in their discrete 
moments, the atoms would be uudetermined even by the understand 
ing of Tathagata. 
35. (The author continues :)59 Just as the illusive idea of 
permanance appears to us as a result of continuous rise of homogene-
ous moments (-= momentary atoms) in succession, just so the 
illusive idea of a patch of blue appears as a result of cognition 
of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms. , 
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36. When60 we cognize in our mind the uninterrupted and 
homogeneous atoms, our constructive thought constructs their 
oneness61 • 
37. Therefore62 the theory (of the Idealists) that the atoms 
in their self-substance are not reflected in our63 consiousness is 
totally unfounded. 
38. What 64 a form of object is reflected in a knowledge, 
from that object-form its knowledge does net arise, and this 
object-form is not a substance (dravya) and resembles the double65 
moon: (says-Dinnaga). lhis conclusion is not a sound one 
because its hetu, probans is not at all proved as valid one. 
39. The 66 atoms which being integrated, discharge a uniform 
action are termed Sancita,67 integrated;-to the upholder of this 
opinion how do the ato.ms become non-substances (adravya)? 
40. They E8 (atcms) are spoken of as one but they possess 
no oneness. For, the import of all words being investigated 
is not at all reflected in the sensuous consciousness.59 
41. The70 philosopher (i.e. Idealist) who states that one 
part of the mind reflects as the object-image in consciousness 
must have witnessed a piece of carpet with pictures in variegated 
colours71 (Citrapafaka). 
42. Inn certain place, when an image of certain object 
(rupa) is cognized, that image being related to higher and lower 
areas (asraya) appears divided (to form) a picture in varied 
forms73 • 
43. An74 atom which may manifest its own single knowledge 
cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When it 
appears associated with other atoms it loses its atomic form, 
how then could each of the atoms appear to our knowledge 175 
44. Atoms76 cannot each individual1y and independently 
appear in life and this is also the reason why each of the 
atoms never flashes out in our consciousness. 
45. Vasubandhu's77 cri!ici~m of the atems on the basis of 
their spacial distinctions is baseless7s , For, the term, space 
(diksabda) is employed on the atom itself that is associated 
with some other atoms. 
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46. Hence79 by the spacial distinctions the atoms themselves 
are meant when surrounded by severalBo other atoms hut never 
the atoms are constituted of parts. 
47. When81 one atom is situated at the bottom and the 
other on the other side they so situated never become double 
on account of these two sides. 
48. WhenB2 the atoms are situated in the midst of several 
atoms, they are imagined as many and likewise by the process 
of reverse of the one th~y are assumed as many. 
49. A83 (gross) form distinct from its own, for example. is 
witnessed on the atoms as a result of their mutual combinations 
(Lit. one depending upon another) but this gross form does 
not at all exist there just like a distinction of the front and the 
back made on the atoms.B4 
50. If,85 as a result of atoms being uninterruptedly knit 
together in a large number, one substantial whole (avayavin) is 
conceived, why will not the moments that are preceeding and 
succeeding in an uninterrupted succession be conceived S086 (i.e. 
one indivisible time-unit)? 
51. Since87 knowledge continues to exist for two momentsB8 
its uninterrupted existence (nairantarya) is possible, yet the form 
of one unit (avayavi-rupa) is not permissible on the knowledge; 
the same principle is likewise applicable to the atomsB9 also. 
52. By90 virtue of a peculiar relationship (pratYCIsatti) amongst 
ato01s the entry of a moving body into the aggregated company 
of atoms is hindered and by the same device the covering of 
atoms by other atoms is accepted, but not due to their consti-
tuent parts.91 
53. The92 shadow is produced when there is a covering 
of the sun, but that shadow is not proper to be accepted as 
existing in between the two atoms of the sun.93 
. 54. Just94 as the power of producing the shadow and 
covering is the phenomenon of several united things so also is 
the case with several atoms but no single atoms can produce 
such phenomenon. 
55. Therefore95 what is stated by Vasubandhu that a lump 
(pinda) is impossible to exist96 since the distinction between the 
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atoms and the lump is not available, may perhaps be accidental 
(kadacitka) if there is any propriety in maintaining the atoms 
as stagnant (i.e. never transformed into any other form under 
any circumstances). 
56. The97 atoms, (though) they are mutually un~related98 
and devoid of parts, nevertheless become integrated and accom-
plish (the gross things like) the globe of earth, and others. 
57. By99 virtue of some excellence of lUutuai efficiency 
(anugraha) the atoms become transformed and likewise they never 
become scattered (i.e.) of the diamond (vajra) and other such 
things. 
58. Certain 'OO atoms become integrated by virtue of their 
peculiar substance-efficiency (dravya-sakti) just like the evil spirit 
(pisaca) the serpent and others are subdued by force of ma7ltra-
sakti. 
59. But'O ! there are many other atoms having very little 
power and strength'02 (to appear in life). 
The103 person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in 
a mountain (acala) and such other places could count the atoms 
of the hell (and the heaven9, etc. wlth their numbers and other 
distinctions. 
60-61a. Therefore,04 it is not proper to declare that the 
atoms do not at all exist. If you say that the affirmation of 
the atoms has been made due to some illusion (bhranti) then 
your understanding105 that everything is nothing but the activity 
of the sixth knowledge (= intellect) would be much more illusory 
resembling an illusory knowledge of the number 'eight' on the 
aggregate of eight atoms. 
6Ib-62. ifl06 you plead that the conception of the atoms is 
a notion mistaken for some other basicl07 thing for these two 
considerations, viz. (1) that things like the hell, etc. are known 
as nothing but condemned living beings'08 and (2) that the atoms 
are never cognized directly (in our perceptual experiences), then 
why do you not state likewise (as illusory) of the number 
form and other characteristics of Pradhana 109 and Purusa, etc.? 
63. YoullO may say: The same remark holds good with 
regard to such things also because Pradhana is regarded in the 
terms of some excellence of characters (gunatisaya) (like sattva, 
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rajas and tamas). I now reply: though the conception of 
Pradhana, etc. is illusory, this does not warrant us to forsake 
our previous contention (about the atoms). 
64. Thereforelll the atoms are existing really. They are 
not cognized by any body other the sages living inll2 a mountain 
and other places. The atoms are conceived because the saints 
cognize them. 
Saha-vedana, co-cognition possible 
65. When
"
! two persons (look at an object) in a place, it 
is an invariable rule that they have simultaneous cognition of it; 
it is also the law of nature that knowledge with its content (lit. 
knowable) are invariably cognized at once. 114 
66. There1!5 is no cognizer other than knowledge and the 
visual knowledge is no more cognizer in the absence of visible 
objects, and therefore their cogniti on is simultaneous but this 
co-cognition is not due to the identity between the object, i.e. 
patch of blue and its cognizer. 
67. Ift16 the consciousness is not in the mood of c;Jgnizer 
or the knowledge is bereft of an object, then only that could 
reasonably be stated so and not otherwise. 117 
68. Ift l8 the term saha is employed to signify one and the 
same time the reason (Le. &lhopalambha) becomes indefinite in 
all respects (anaikantika) when it is appli~d to the Buddha's 
knowledge which co-exists with its content, other's mind (jneyacetasa) 
and the mind that co-exists with mental properties (citta-caittaisca). 
69. Iftl9 the mental properties are not illusory as they are 
sanctioned in the scriptures; how do you then say that the 
knowledge of the ghost,'ZO hell and others is an illusion? 
70. If,IZI even in the absence of any relevancy some distinc-
tion (between the idea of the hell, etc. and the mental elements) 
saves your difficulty (lit. serves your purpose), that distinction 
is absolutely unproved, yet you cherish it proved; thus your 
rejoinder is based again on illusion. 
71. The 'zz term 'saha' co-existence is never employed in 
the world in any place where a companion is not available. 
The reason (hetu-Sahopalambha) will then be a contradictory one 
if there is really a co-cognition. 
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72. If'.23 the term Saha 'co-existence' is taken to mean one 
and the same thing (ekarth'l) then hetu would be unproved 
(asiddha) for other party;124 for example when some common 
things are present, how does only one person look at them? 
73. Ifl2s every mind of other living beings is cognized by 
the knowledge of the omniscient being, then, where is it proved 
that only one person experiences it (ekena upalambha) ? 
74. The'26 object-cause felt by a peron internally in his own 
mind cannot be denied by any other person, as there can be 
no evidence for doing so. 
The reason (hetu) further becomes doubtful and unproved 
on the ground that it is, in its very nature, far removed, Le. 
beyond the reach of other's cognizance (svabhava-viprakrsta = 
nan-bshin. bkhal. ba). 
75. Ip.27 the reason (hetu) considered to be proved as a 
result of the denial of external things and (thus leading to 
the conclusion) that one aspect of the consciousness itself is 
cognizable, then the reason would be known to only onepartyl28 
who plead far the doctrine of mind alone (cittamatrata). 
76. Tfl29 you consider it a proven fact that the knowledge and 
the knowable flash out as identical (aprthakbhasa), then the reason 
would simply prove what is already proved. Even the advocate 
of knowledge having the capacity to assume the image of the 
object (sakarajnanavadin) would not dispute here in' this matter130 
(thus leading to siddhasadhanata). 
77. If you l31 conceive the object-cause as identical (with 
its knowledge) how is it that the object-cause is cognized distinctly 
from the knowledge? 
78. Suppose,132 for example, a man, while experiencing an 
external object (artha), has joyful feelings in this wise: this shell 
is black, if these feelings are regarded as coming from the 
knowledge itself this will be improbable in the absence of experience 
of the object in that fashion. 133 
79. If'34 certain imaginary form (kalpita-rupa i.e. black) of 
knowledge is experienced, theQ its real form i~ not experienced; 
therefore the reason (Sahopalambha) is not proper to set up. 
80. For13s this reason two formsl3l'· of the knowled2e are to 
be experienced in the same manner as the double moon is 
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looked at by some. Thus the author's ( = Dharmakirti) statement 
of "one" (abheda) becomes unfounded. 
81. Them causal factors (s'1magri)!38 of thepreceed ing moment 
give rise to a full cognition of the object in the next moment just 
in the same fashion as a visible object (rupa) in association 
with the light produces its cognition, due to which fact a successive'39 
cognition (sahavedana) would become justifiable. 
~ 82. When140 the knowledge and its sense-organ happen 
to be just one after another (purvapara) the term co·cognitiOn 
(sahavedan.l) is used by way of similarity (with a simultaneous 
phenomenon) but never there is literally co-cognition (sahavedanam 
na arthatah). 
83. Sincel41 the knowledge-content is felt internally, it is 
no entity other than the self of knowledge; to the advocate 
of the system of maintaining the knowledge possessing a knowable 
aspect in itself the reason becomes undetermined. '42 
84. Since'43 it is the law of nature that a knowledge cognizes 
its content (jnanam vetti), the knowledge is said to be cognized; 
since the content produces the knowledge as reflector of itself 
it is consided as cognized.144 
85. Though145 the term 'cognized' (samvedya) is applied 
equally to the knowledge and its content, its tmport is quite 
different. FO.r, the wild cow, etc, e.g. are not regarded of the 
(same) forms, visanin, horned figure on account of 145A the usage 
of the term, cow, etc. 
86. There146 are certain dharmas which are contemplated 
in the minds of other streams of e-Iements (santanantara) are 
perceived by the knowledge of the Omniscient (Sarvajna). Then 
the reason (when it is applied to those dharmas) becomes uncer-
tain,146A anaikantika (because they are perceived simultaneously, 
yet distinct from the knowledge of the Omniscient). If he does 
not comprehend them, how can he be an Omniscient ?146B 
87. In l47 the system of the image-invested knowledge (of 
the Sautrantika) the knowledge is perceIved only when it reflects 
the image of an obJect. If you desire to prove the identity 
of the knowledge with its reflected image the reason would 
then, simply achieve what is already achieved (siddlza-sadhanata). 
88. Theus external thing (artha) produces in the knowledge 
an image similar to itself and as a result of this fact it i~ 
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considered as perceived figuratively.149 The external thing is not 
at all perceived and hence its identity with knowledge win not 
be proved. 
89. If 150 you ask: How is the knowledge (or consciouness) 
considered to be the cognizer of its object? (we answer:) the 
consciousness is characterized as (if it is) measuring the object 
(tat pariccheda lab'ana) and therefore no query sh0uld be made 
as to: how is it and what like it is? 
90. (In'51 the system of th:: Sautrantika-Yoga.caras) an image 
is aroused and imprinted in consciousness by the external things; 
how could it be said thlt the consciousness is a measurer of 
the external thing (artha-paricchedaka) ? 
91. Consciousness152 (by law of nature) is considered to be 
entirely a comprehending agent and hence it is irrelevant to 
ask how the consciousness would comprehend its own objecLI53 
92. The154 cons::iousness is not creator. of any thing and 
in fact, it is functionleJs. Its characteristic, however, is mere 
awareness of the presence of an object1SS (vittimatra), but the 
act of creation, is attributed to it by impDsition (samaropa). 
93. Just1S6 as a saint of detached vision enters into the self 
of knowledge (jnana-rupa) , etc. so aho the person of a meagre 
vision enter.:: into it. 
94. NC,IS7 distinction exists between the Saint and the world-
ling so far as their knowledge alone it;; concerned. But the great 
souls h0wever, are distinguished by their knowledge of varied 
aspects 1S8 (Sarvakaradhi). 
95. 00'59 we enquire into the knowledge of the Buddha 
whether it assumes the image of the object or does not, and 
again whether it comprehends the object Simultaneously or 
successively. 160 
Akara-vada disproved 
96. What191 image according to you, presumably exists as 
pertaining to an object-knowledge, that image exists in fact only 
in the external thing like the visible element (rupa), etc. but 
it is assumed to ex'ist in the knowledge. '62 
97. ft'63 is irrelevant to say that not any cognizable thing 
exists for the Saint who has given up all obscurations '64 (al'arana); 
for he is anchored in this cognizable (world); how can it be 
substituted and equalized to the mind alone (tanmatra-sama) ? 
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98. Ollr,I65 intellect is sole demonstrating agent whether the 
external thing exists or does not exist. There really exist the 
external objects to which fact no contradiction is experienced,'66 
for example in the case of eye-disrase, etc. some figure is observed 
even when there is not any figure. 
99. Likewise'66 one thinks that he experiences in the knowledge 
a patch of blue and accordingly impose3 upon the knO\vledge 
the presence of the blue image but in fact no such image 
exists in it. 
100. The ls7 assumption that the image exi!l;ts in the know-
ledge or does not exist 1., a type of consciousness in the nature 
of a productive imagination ('kalpanatma). The consciousness, 
however, becomes differt:ntiated due to visesa, individual charac-
teristic of the observed object.16s 
101. You169 plead that the knowledge which is in fact 
imageless l70 experiences its unreal image, I likewise, advocate that 
the imageless knowledge experiences the real external thing. 
102. Therel7l is not a distinct self of the knowledge (in the 
form of a separate knowable aspect); for, to assume it would 
contradict the non-dual essence of the knowledge ( advaya-jnana). 
No unreal image could be experienced by < the knowledge; (if 
the image is experienced) it would turn to be non-il1usory. 
103. Tf 17,2 (you argue that) the above arrangement has been 
made in accordance with the presumption under the influence 
of the deep rooted illusion. then the image of the knowledge 
ought to be viewed as illusory,173 otherwise how could it be 
an assumed image? 
104. Hence174 consciousness which is imageless in truth, 
would comprehend (pariccid) through the agency of the material 
eye, etc. a11 the fitting things whether existent or non-existent '75 
105. 1f l76 (you say that) just as the lampl77 illumines the self 
as well as others, just so the consciousness (illumines) the selves 
of two alarnbanas l7s (of one kind); then, there would be no 
contradiction at all. 
106. Howeverl79 the various objects, visible, sound etc. are 
domains of various!80 sense-organs.; hence they cannot be 
experienced by one sense-organ. 
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ID7a-b. (According to you) even when different causes are 
absent the knowledge is experienced as (in the presence of) 
alambana. 181 
107c-9a. A 182 knowledge arises from an external object as 
similar to it and that k110wledge in the immediately next moment 
bears an image similar to that external thing:-this contention 
is a simple illusionl83; for, the knowledge does not exist as 
permanent (to assume the image of the object). Further there 
is not any experience of the self of the knowledge similar to 
the object at the moment when th'J object becomes illuminated. 
l09b-IOa. Inl84 every mind the knowledge form l8s is uniform-if 
this view is favoured, it could not be stated particularly. it is 
similar to this object. 
1I0b-d. When!86 this (knowledge) illumines the cognizable 
thing no knowledge immediatelv after that would appear, because 
it . becomes entirely assimilated with its contentl87 (visaya). 
111-12b. If,188 while the knowledge lights up just a patch 
of blue, etc. the knowledge lighting up the patch of blue, etc. 
exists immediately after that, and then, jf it exists having the 
patch of blue as its content, then at that tIme the knowledge is 
not similar to the object. True, it exists indeed, but never similar 
(to its content). 
Grahya aspect criticised 
ll2c-l3. The!8S Tathagata's saying, for example, that all is 
impermanent and sorrowful does not exhibit as content the 
cognizable aspect of knowledge (grahyabhaga). 
If you are inclined to plead that since the object-cause (alambana) 
is not fit to exist in the external, the cognizable aspect of the 
knowledge is accepted as the content, then the characteristic'90 of 
the content cannot appropriately be applied to it (= content). 
114. HowlS! does the mind exist as separated from its act 
of construction 1192 That idea is only a fancy of your mind (cittasvaa-
bhasa). There does not exist the mind shedding light on its content, 
because the latter is not available (for you) other the mind itself. 
115a-b. If!S3 there is nothing productive (of the knowledge), 
how is it at all desiredl94 (as content) 1 
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Discussion on the actual object 
115c-16b. The'95 simple atoms and the co-aguhted atoms 
(in your system) are not the object-causes, because they lack 
one requisite (anga) each. '96 How is the denia1 of both (simple 
and co-agulated atoms) cherished? 
I J6c-17b. The197 knowledge in the form of cognizer is devoid 
of two characteristics (of alambana, viz. objectivity and causality), 
Then if there is no object-cause (alambana) (for you) the cognizable 
aspect of knowledge is also not accepted (by us). 
117c-18b. The198 opinion that a similar '99 knowledge of the 
previous moment serves as the object-cause (of the next following 
knowledge) is also improper; for. no knowledge flashes up (bhati) 
immediately after a similar knowledge. 
118c-19b. Jpoo the knowledge in the form of a visible object 
(rupa) arises due to contact with the knowledge of the sound, 
how wiII that knowledge of rupa be similar to the alambana, 
i.e. sound ?201 
119c-20b. Some202 consider that a force (sakti) producing a 
knowledge akin to its content is the object-cause.z03 This opinion 
is also improper; for, no force, sakti is reflected in the sensuous 
knowledge. 
120c-2Ib. Jf 204 (you again argue that) the objectivity lies in 
the cognizable part of knowledge and that alone remains invariably 
as the object, (we may reply that) the external thing (artha) 
(as the object) has been proved from the standpoint of the world 
and therefore its characteristic as alamhana exists indeed though 
not expressly stated. 
12Ic-22b. JfZ05 you say that the force of knowledge is also 
quite familiar with the world, it is not definitely proved as 
the content (artha). Jf it lacks the characteristic206 (of alambana) 
how can it be a!ambana? 
122c-23b. (Thus)207 it is proper to maintain on close scrutiny 
that the external object-cause alone is desirable on the authority 
of the world and scripture, but never the cognizable aspect of 
knowledge by any means.208 
123c-24b. TheZ09 0bjects 1ike desirable and undesirablez,o never 
exist in the external in truth and hence all this is nothing but 
mind: this contention is absolutely irrelevant. 
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124c-25b. On211 certain unpleasant material object if one 
meditates as good (he experiences it as good); for, the result 
becomes distinguished with some benefaction on account of varied 
causes.2Il~ 
125c-26b. Certain213 knowledge relating to an object (artha) 
reflects (the same object) as a patch of bluish (vinilaka) and 
immediately after that (the object) turns to be in the form of 
unpleasant thingt etc. (duhkharupadi) on account of meditation; 
likewise it may become otherwise on account of other causes. 
I 26c-27b. Feelings214 like joy, sorrow and dullness are 
all become differentiated by virtue of kinds of meditation but 
they never arise from any kind of external things-if this is 
your contention; how is it proper? 
127c-28b. (1he215 Idealist continues) All your refutations 
are made on the assumption (of external things) (aropa); Why is 
it unreasonable to accept the truth of no alambana in the external? 
The external things we eGtablish' by virtue of their efficiency 
(arthakriya) and we negate them when there is no efficiency. 
128c-30c. If 216 you say, even in the absence of the external 
things the purposive action217 is achieved and therefore the 
external things are not accepted, then we may reply that 
we establish their existence not merely on account of their 
efficiency, but also on account of efficiency being witnessed 
even in the case of their perverted knowledge (viparyaya-jnana). 
130d-3Ic. BuP'S again as a result of securing the external 
things good or harm could be afflicted to the body; some sort 
of simple efficiency (kriyamatraF'9 is experienced even in the 
case of a mistaken notion (vibhrama) of some thing present for 
something a bsen t. 
13Id-132c. As220 to the argument based on the sexual act 
(kama-carita) 221 in dream, we may say that the semen-discharge 
is a necessary phenomenon. If one has not that phenomenon, 
how can he be considered to have gained the sexual pleasure 
(one of the four purposes of human actions) ? 
132d-133c. Since222 the semen-discharge and the extreme 
passion (raga) are specially related (to each other) the former 
happens also on the occasion other than the dream; for example 
when one embraces a woman out of extreme love no contradiction 
is felt to the phenomenon of semen-discharge. 
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133d-134c. If/23 in the presence of a woman, the discharge 
happens out of extreme passion why does one not discharge 
the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream ? 
134d-135c. If/24 in the absence of a woman, the discharge 
happens out of extreme passion, why does he not discharge the nail, 
the tooth, etc. as he diClcharges semen in dream 1 
135d-136b. The225 semen being discharged out of extreme 
passion (raga) the purpose of life is fulfilled :-this idea is not a 
happy one.2Z6 
136d-137b. For227 example, when it is not spoken even as 
a simple act,228 the gain of the son, etc. that are experienced in 
dreaD? as realities are all contradicted to the actually perceptual 
experIences. 
137c-138c. Since229 there really exist the keepers230 of the 
hell, etc. as produced from the said acts, the system of everything 
as a reflected image of consciousness is neither admissible nor' is any 
purposive action in dream po·3sible. Therefore the doctrine of 
Cittamatrata "mind alone" becomes unproved. 
138d-139c. When231 different living bodies are evident' fOf 
proving the existence of other mines, the existence of the hell 
also may likewi~e. be (entertained). On what evidence then do 
you deny the existence of other hving beings 1232 
139d-140c.· Similarly233 the god (Le. Garuda) bestowing 
the boon of reviving the life (anugraha) on the person who is 
dead on account venom poured out from the hood (of a serpent) 
remains true in his promise.234 
140d-14Ib. In235 the absence of preliminary236 rites efficient act 
can not be accomplLhed; therefore that (efficient act) is not a simple 
creation of the mind. 
141c-d. Why231 is the knowledge of the others' thought-
discerner is untrue (ayathartha)'t238 
142. Whe1l239 other's mind being present our knowledge enters 
into it (th'-lt knowledge is considered to be its cognizer). (or) when 
some object being present, the knowledge assumes the image240 of 
- that object, then the knowledge is considered to be its cognizer. 
143a-c. The24 1 grasping of an object (by the mind) is not an 
act similar to that of running242 towards its object, just immediately 
after which the knowledge .. wuuld arise. 
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143d-144b. Sow also i& the case with the knowledge of one's 
own mind. 244 (In both the cases) the mind is regarded as cognizer 
in the manner abuve described (i.e. pariccheda-laksana). 
144c-145b. The24s memory is a mind being directed towards 
the past thing What is directed towards the past (bhuta= yan-dag) 
is not a cognition246 (graha) because that mind does not flash up 
from its c:wse. 
145c-146b. The241 non-dual form (advaya-rupa) which is 
(supposed to be) domain of the well-awakened (Sambudda) is not 
cognizable to us and therefore 248 untrue (ayathartha). What 
is said to be untrue, is un-satisfactory became of the non-dual 
nature (advayatvat) of the knowledge. 
146c-147b. The249 Buddha is Omniscient because he comprehends 
the entire cognizable universe through the agency of his cognizing 
knowledge, and not because he does so in a non-dual form.2so 
147c-148c. To251 what is said (by Dignaga), viz. a non-describ-
able form is cognized (by one's own self, we now ask:) What252 is 
cognized by other person, is it possible to describe because the 
other's mind can be comprehended 1 
148d-49. Then253 there exists definitely the object-cause in the 
external and therefore every mind is not at all (proved to be) 
objectless (niralambana). If the mind has not any cognizable in 
the external anywhere, how could one become omniscient 1254 
150-151b. By2SS comprehending one's own mind alone there 
may be nothing but the self-knowledge of the mind (svasamvedana). 
If anyone is supposed to be omniscient by merely com-
prehending one's own mind and he is known to be a separate 
individual then there would be no realisation of the mind alone 
(cittamatra-darsana) . 
151c-152b. 1[25\'1 you think that this defect is obviated in view 
of the fact that the knowledge is non-dual in its nature, how, 
then does that (non-dual) knowledge comprehend its content? 
] 52c- (lf257 you say again, that) when the knowledge becomes 
freed from every kind of dual form then it comprehends the 
universe in all aspects- this saying is indeed a matter of great 
wonder. Therefore there is one (I.e. omniscient) in the nature 
of comprehending (grahaka-rupa) (the entire universe). 
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153. There258 is not any person known to us as omniscient-
says a self~styled wiseman259 amongst the so called learned persons; 
but this saying reveals his dull intellect (sva~durmati) being 
engrossed in it. . 
154. AS260 the actual experiences dictate it is possible that 
as a result of cont~mplation on certain definite antidote the whole 
group of desire and other defilements are entirely destroyed. 
155. But 261 there is hardly any possibility of applying an 
antidote in the case (of the Y ogacara conception of ema ncipa-
tion; for the Yogacara holds) that the mind of all worldlings 
is under the firm grip of dual forms (subject and object) and this 
idea of dual form may be destroyed by contemplation on some 
object. 
156. The:!o2 knowledge which flashes out in the form 'this 
is void (sunya)' is related to (lit. entered into) to the said 
dual forms and such knowledge being associated with dual forms; 
how can it serve as an antidote ?263 
157. Just204 as one meditating on a desirable object does 
not destroy his desire, just so a man meditating on a thing in 
dual form does not destroy the idea of dual form. 
158. Assuming26S in the mind an idea of entity266 one 
contemplates upon it of no-soul. But the principle of non-duality, 
a mere word has not any purpose (nirartha) and hence a contem-
plation upon it will be quite unnecessary. 
159. The267 contemplation upon impermanence frees one 
quickly from the delusion of permanence. (-a reasonable proposi-
tion). (But in your system) by discarding every kind of perceptual 
experiences one necessarily secures Buddhahood (not a reasonable 
proposition). 
160. The 268 person who is free from every kind of perceptual 
experiences is completely inactive. Thus Buddhahood is desired (by 
you) without making any effort and practice.209 
161. Therefore270 the state of well-faring (Saugata-pada) i.e. 
Buddhahood is secured on constant practice of compassion towards 
the sentient beings, doing good for them, and meditating on every 
manifested elements of existence as impermanent (samas krta-
anitya).271 
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162. WhenZ7Z one entertains the idea of mind alone, how 
could he fulfil the preliminary duties such as charity, etc. In 
the absence of charity there is no possibility of one obtaining 
the Buddhahood. 
163. Ip73 you argue that under the influence of mutual 
causation and on the principlez74 of mind-alone thought arises 
in the form of acts like giving and taking the charity. That 
cannot be proved either by percaption, inference or reliable 
scripture. Such system is only a presumption and it is nothing 
but a verbal eloquence. 
165. When z75 one practises repeatedly and several times men-
tally a charity-thought (i.e. the thought in the form of charity) 
it never releases anybody from poverty. 
166. EvenZ76 if innumerable thoughts (manaskara) of Yogins 
are meditated upon (by us) neither happiness is gained nor 
misery is removed in reality. 
167. InZ77 doling out everything (material) to all living beings 
and in fulfilling the charity of compassion there exists no distinction 
in the nature of things (arthatmana=arlhasrarupa) however, in 
practising the compassion-charity we have a prohibitive injunction 
not to give certainz78 things (viz. three garments, etc). 
168. Therez79 was great Decease of the Buddha in the world 
and we have his relic now as his mortal remains. The mansil)ll 
and monastery, etc. are witnessed by us; how can they be 
products of the mind-alonezBo (lit. paratantra) ? 
169 Ip81 these things have no existence of their own how 
can we infer therefrom the great events of the past? If the past 
events are not inferred, the whole system would be reduced into 
an extreme materialism (10 fwyata). 
170. Azaz man witnessing the relics of the Saint who is 
purified through emancipation of the Sravaka, disciple becomes 
free from passions. If he has no recollection (lit. inference) of 
the past event, how can he entertain the faith (in his relics) ? 
171. HZ84 (you say) it is produced by succession (prabandha) 
of people the life is seen to be cut off. If you again say that 
one continues to exist due to other, how would there be complete 
and last deliverance285 (parinirvana) ? 
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172. IF86 is the settled fact in the worldly system that from 
the seed, etc. come up sprout, etc. and therefore there is not 
any sOllnd reasoning for the plea that the whole universe is 
nothing but the mind. 
173: When287 a knowledge arises immediately after a know-
ledge, the subsequent knowledge is the result of the previous 
knowledge-cause.288 This rule is also not permissible (in your system). 
174. Thus/a9 (e.g.) there would arise the knowledge of smoke 
in the absence of the knowledge ofthe290 fire, and also the knowledge 
of the sprout would arise from non-knowledge of the seed. 
175. 1[291 you plead that mind perfumed by the knowledge 
of the fire produces (lit. is the cause of) the knowledge of the 
smoke; when there are several potentialities (sakti) in the mind, 
wherefrom could arise the thought of distinction? 
176. If292 the cause immediately preceeding knowledge (or 
mind) of fire is the cause of the mind of the smoke, that also is 
not good; for, the mind of fire is not definite (=concomitant) 
with the mind of smoke. 
177. When293 the concomitance is completely unproved how 
do the people talk in the unmixed terms about the cause thus: 
this result arises from that cause? 
178. Therefor&94 the doctrine that the whole universe is 
Chittamatra, 'mind-alone' has been declared (by the Buddha) 
aiming at the imaginary or assumed aspect of the external things 
(kalpitam asritya) but not because the matter, etc. are improbable 
to exist. 295 
179. For296 what (object) one may display desire and other 
passions, Buddha viewing that object as merely an imaginary 
(kalpita = Vikalpita) has preached the doctrine of no-soul with 
reference to these (the assumed) things296 a in order to remove 
all such passions (dosa) of the worldings. 
180. Similarly 297 in other places too the Buddha has stated 
that the external things do not exist in such forms as are assumed 
by the ordinary woddings.298 Why is it so? (Buddha's knowledge) 
is superior to (that of ordinary wOrldings). 
181. Since299 some sort of agent has been just previously 
stated and the duties are understood alongside of the attachment 
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towards an agent as real the idea ~ of agent as real is necessarily 
to be negated.loo 
182-183. I n301 other places it has been likewise declared thus: 
1here is something inferred (kalpita) and some other thing 
fancied, vikalpita (:-:- parikalpita). The true form of dharmata 
(dharmata-rupa-= gzugs -=form= svarupa) has been explained thus; 
dharmata is svalaksana, self-essence. What is kalpita is no other 
than a basic reality (bhavamatra), ano the vikalpita is its diversity 
(bheda). This diversity of dharmata wilJ be inappropriate in the 
absence af bhava302. (some basic entity, i.e. atoms). 
184. Ip03 the Rupa is declared to be sunya (devoid of rupa-
nature) how the term rupa is employed on it ? If you argue that 
it is done so on the assumption of the rupa-nature, what is the 
ultimate objective (phala) gained304 (therefrom)? 
185. OP05 what object any contradiction is impossible to 
exist that object thereby is verily existing. 306 (But, for the opponents) 
since everything is non-existing their experiences are not really 
there as in the dream.307 
t 86. The308 advocates of the external reality point out to 
the Ideali"t (citta-matrata-vadin) thus: Let the men of erudition 
investigate whether this (my conclusion) is just appropriate or not. 
J 87. ...Bup09 I have no wonderful (wise) knowledge suited to 
investigate what is right and what is wrong; I have however 
stated in brief the truths propounded by other masters. 
188. The310 wise men realize the destruction of ignorance 
darkness by means of the lustre of their true knowledge. HeDce-




1. This verse may be rendered into Sanskrit: 
q-f~4 '" ~: ~d qu~ ~~S\ ~~~ I 
if'R)~' 51"ur;~Nfu~liTq~1 f.".~t~ II ~ II 
2. In accordance with the tradition the author speaks of the Bud-
dha as possessing two qualities, svartha and parartha as done by 
Vasubandhu (Kosa, I, ver. 1), Dignaga (Pram. Sam. I. ver.-
1. with vrttih. v, my Review in ALB,) and the author of the 
Sutralankara Kalpanamandatika), Chap. I (v. my Sanskrit 
text, pu blis1led in the journal of Sri Venkata. Institute'. 
Tirupati, 1941). 
3. ~q~~it\ifTf~fq~T;;fcrtlllT'if;; ifT~<li: I 
~f[~~:r<li~) a \i{r~qT~hr+mFnq: II ~ II 
-
a. lit ~qT('[.-Jnanatva as Sadhana, reason is referred to in the 
verse 29 below. -
4. This is the conclusion arrived at in the Vimsatika and the 
Alambana-pariksa. 
5. <iffwN: ~ itfa ~f.Q1::rrQl~~T I 
a:rfcro" CTT«!'NTG:TCTffa~ ~~~~ II ~ II 
6. Dharmakirti's definition of pramana is: snn1Jl1ifCFfCTTfu ~i{l{, 
3l~~~fu: ~GfT~+{ •••.• 1 Pram. vartika, I, ver, 1. Subhagupta's 
one of the arguments to prove his externalism is avisamvaditva; 
cfr. Tatt. San. panjika. p. 574, 11. 20, tI. 
7 . ~ '" I Cffl' qriU~ ~'1TG:');:rp:rmifa: I 
3lmr.ri ~ ooq: ~~li ~~ ~)'<1;;+{ II 'i II 
8. ~~~~1 m: ~it [it];; ~q~ot ~ I 
~~'ilf(l'imrrf(l ~ ~T a;;1; 1\ X II 
'" 
a = the word is used to bring out the Tib. expression: mi-gyur-
ram implying a simple query. 
9. 1fi~ij: fu~y qyi{ ('qC<HlfOlT fO{"aT I 
~fe ~ t'cf ~~ ~~ ~: II , II 
10. The Realists, while opposing the extreme idealism. genrally 
raises such objection as the present one to prove its absurdity. 
It may be interesting to Compare a European parallel: Dr. 
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Johnson is said to have expressed his opinion on Berkeley's. 
philosophy by kicking" '8. stone with his foot and saying: No, 
Sir, I prove it wrong (Sir James Jean, Mysteriolls Universe, 
the Bridge series, p. 71), 
1 I , );fF:C'lll ~WJfCOO'fl .,Tfur ;:fT+ffqq<f:q: I 
a:rm;=(f+ffGf~'nf"{ ID.f a<;ifFcT fGfBq~ II \9 II 
a =fq~GfTf~ ~a- I 
12. In the illusion there is always a perversion in naming things; 
e.g. in rope-snake illusion the snake-name is mistaken for 
the rope-name. 
13. ~q:yTq: OfiWT~.,r:q~T<f l;;g fGf~~ I 
a-~);fF~ 'f1~l;:f "R1~mra-~~UT+r. II t:; 11 
14. The idea meant here is this: Time and space are not different 
from the materialt hings, i e. au ms; cp. Nya. binda-pradipa 
p.44. "T~ f~ +rTB+fT<f ~q:y: "Tq~y ~qr: opf~~T+rHfij- I and Pram. va. 
bhasya. p. 188: ., ~T "T+fTq~T ~qyf~+:q: I The Buddhists including 
the Sarvasti-vadin maintain that every thing is momentary 
and the moment is no other than the thing itself. 
15. ~~Tf~~T"Tq, m'flfa- ~ fGf~frm: I 
a{~~: !f~itcf "Y'lT<la-T+JT'flf"ffi:n: II ~ II 
fq«GfG"fa- ar.[C'Gf+{ I 
'" ' 
16. A partly definition of yogin. 
17. This is explained in the Puggalapannattl, p. 145: ~~ep".ijT 
T'f~T ~ fGf+fY"fif 0fiTit'1 ~f~C'GfT fcr~fa- I '1oOff:q 'T3ff~ f~ ~ 
qf~~Turr ~Yf(f I ar:i ~f(f T~T \3+ra-Y 'lTT'ffGflf'nT I Abh-kosa 
(Poussin, VI, p. 276) ; One who is entered in Nirodhasamaptti 
is named 'doubly delivered', because by force of prajna 
and Samadhi he is delivered from klesa-avarana and 
vimoksa-avarana (cp. 8 vimoksas in VIII, p. 205) Satya siddhi, 
chap. 163 (Eng. Summary) If he gains both, he is 
ubhayato-bhaga·vimukta; for the defiJement is one part and 
the element hindering dhyana-concentration is another 
part. (v. also chap. x. end) V. Magga (XXI para 78). 
a{~q\i11Ft., ~ Off~lf11riFr 'T3frf(f \3+RJT 'lTTiR fGf~) fa- 1d'01~T 
+rT'ffcf~ ... ... .. I 
18. 
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~mq<::ftffiift a er;rr:r, 
«F<TT~q'S: f.,f~~1 ~~Cfr<::T~m;r: ~: II Z" II 
a = apiij'Tfcr ~~rcrc=>J6,)fcr: I 
19 . mHf~T ~~ ~cr, "3'ffi: 'qt;;:f~ .,1' ~cr: I 
l1TlTR1l1!:fWnm ~~~Tf('ffi: '3;i1: II <j <j II 
20. a;f.,f<:~~T~T~!fu<:fr~1'n!RfllRiC'Cf6: I 
filqmfccr;xfqf~crT ~~T ~~~aq: II Z";( 1\ 
21. It is difficult to understand the author's intention here. 
According to Abh. kosa theory of momentariness is 
applicable to the elements both internal and external. 
It is the Theravadin who makes a distinction in applying 
it to the elements and pleads that the material elements 
continue tc exist for 17 thought-moments (Y, Abh. Athasan, 
IV. 86. Kosarnbi's Tika, p. 67). Despite the rnomentary-
theory the Vaibhasika maintains that karman produces 
its fruits through avijnapti which continues to exist on 
the support of four great elements (v. kosa, I. 11). This 
may not hold good in the Y ogacara system. 
22. ~~ ~'fl~~tf+rf;:~?f ~T~ff I 
cr~~ cr~ tcl'l1TCf~ [2036] fCfi ~ qTS~qT \I 'I ~ II 
'" 
23. Ekarasa~jl1ana advaya-jnana of the Yogacara which 
is dichomotized into subject and objt:'ct due to premordial 
force, (anadi~vasana). It is some',X,hat similar to the 
Sautrantika's ekarasa-skandh'l-:::.jnana, v. Masuda, sects p. 68 
with note 1. 
24. f.:rn1f<rnT~~q cr~FfiCfi~1' ., f"filt I 
fq~ a CfTCfiW1T ., ~: qTCfi~ I!,l~: II <j 'b' \I 
a=Jnana~svabhava. 
25. ~~. ~i?r f.,fu"cr~~ ;:i'tei a+rf~Cf crcrTSq~ +r 
~lfCffcr ~~ ff., qf~~T~l1'1: ~: II <j X ~ 
a == Tib. de-rna;;phyir-mi-brten-shin. 
26. amitf;~~p:fef~ ~~T<fi~ ., "'f I 
'"' (crt?~) ~TCfiTfc~<11n:rr nTT':ij" qf{~~ II <j ~ II 
a=Read in Tib. gan.-gi for gan-gis. 
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27. The idea seems to be this: when the Y ogacara denies the 
external things, there will be no occasion for preaching 
dharma or Hstening to it and arousing the right view 
which leads to the destruction of Vipaka. Dharmakirti, 
however, defends his position thus: i.ficr~ ~T~;g:<:fq i'n!rR~(jr 
3lqci~ I Pram, va. ver. 220. 
28. ~ a (n({cm=ll~ f'lfiIf~ 'if ~(jT J:f~ I 
~qTc{h1T11<itllf~CfTfc;f(j ~a: qr'01:f~~lf,b II ~ \9 II 
a = ~1nfcro' CfT<::f arr~<IT I 
b=See the verse 29. 
29 _ qf<:qTCfiT~(j<ITsf~<:fT<::f: 'SfqT$ I 
f(jfin:m~If) lfTCRfT~T a ~ Cf'F{: ~(jT Of :q II 'l c; 'I 
a = "fm erR -a:rf~~ <:fT<::f: 
30. The knowledge of the eye-dIseased person (taimirika) IS, 
however, contradicted at once. 
31. (jS~;gm ~ J:ICl~~ 1ilr;::(jT~HFlqfSi'(j~T I 
ijS~;a'q'~ 'e~ sfcro' CfT<::fT(f If (fS~f~~-afJ:flSIftt II ~ €. II 
"-
31a. cpo Nya, bindu-Tipp'lni, p. 19 : ~l1T~':q'ill ;rT~cr lffro qT~iffi-
;ffiOflf I Every perceptnal knowledge is Ulusive so far as 
" its object is concerned. 
32. OfR:Tqqf~~If ~cf~q"{~Rt I 
~T~+lcft GtT1:f~ itq ~~+rriI fcr~ If~T II ~ 0 II 
33. This Sakti, according to the Idealist comes into existence 
from the self of consciousness and not from some other 
exterrnal causes. 
34. ~f~~ ~ a ~~ Ifi3ilKf lRf 1J?f :0{ I 
wn<f (fjf ~;tq q:;~~q;;f~ qHFH 1\ ~ 'l " 
;m:TtlJT ~~)qq: 
a =GtTIf~ is to be added from the previous sentence. 
35. This is probablyanadikalika-vasana accepted by the Idealists 
to account for the universal causation elr, Madh. avatara, 
VI, ver. 46 with Bhasya, my sanskrit text, p. 42-43; Bud. 
Logic II, p. 367 with note 3 and p. 400 Jinendrabudhi's 
comment: Every notion of causation is produced by 
Biotic Force; and Alambanapariksa, ver. 8. 
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36. q~~Cf<:t~crRT," fCfj~ Cfj.ruir crr~ <i~ I 
\ijRfr~~ ~~-v:rr W'tl T~1 f~ 1\ ~~ II 
37. Jati flower as a factor in producing fragrance is a common 
example in Indian Sastraic literature, cpo Kosavy. II p.39. 22 
38. CfqIT'l11Wffcml'1!ilJIllld ~OfmH'i1{"", I 
CfQf og:r\ij SH<:TQ;f ft'i~fq fqq=oq~ II ~ ~ II 
39. 3JCf) lffcWCfUiiifTat mer) ifT~Cfrfi:l qfff'1"T I 
ifR:)Q;f qelOfT<iTt<lT ~t'~ ~1'ffifq~Of: II ';(¥ " 
40. Here Sakti-vadin is the Sautrantika. According to him 
seven kinds of consc!ousness (five sensuous, one non-
sensuous consciousnes~ and one mind) are produced from 
their upadana consciousness, a subtle mind in possession 
of all seeds, something resembling the Alaya-consciousness 
of the yogacarin. The- sautrantika contradicts the vasana 
theory postulated by the latter on the assumption that nothing 
is produced from anything but the mind = Alaya-consciousness, 
or the Sautrantika's subtle mind, v. Et. Lamotte, Histoire 
du Buddhisme, p. 673; and Masuda, Sects p. 68. The kosa 
speaks of the seven types of vljnana in this line: !f~mOffRl~) 
ffii:j ( I, 16). . . ' 
We may note here a parallel discussion between the 
Y ogacara and the Sautrantika as reproduced by 'he 
Steherbatsky from Vacaspati's Nyayakanika: (The Yogacara:) 
(The external object is superfluous, there is in the internal) 
Biotic force which accidently becomes mature and evokes 
an idea; this is also accidental ( and changing concomitantly 
with a change its cause). (The Sautrantika:) But, is it 
not your Biotic force in this case simply the force of 
the subject thought contained in one continuous stream, 
the force to produce out of itself, a corresponding the 
objective thought, Bud. Logic, II. p. 367-68). One 
interesting reference to the Sautrantika may be noticed 
here : R1~~Cfifi'1itOf t'CIfcRt'tl \'l;q I ~~~ R' ~TW~f1fcreT: !ff~mrr 
'fiTlJT: ~~~lf fqmOffJ{'E' Of !lfam-;::'tlfqflr"lif~fu I Arthaviniscaya 
Sutratika. The idea probably meant here that the six 
consciousness-bodies are conditioned by Samskara. a subtle 
Sakti formed from the experience of external things; cpo 
the ver. 27 below the same Idea. 
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41. ~qcF?iFPl' ;jjTit8Tfi:T~ a +f~r~+f~ :;{ I 
42, 
<J,~Ttr ~~ q~~.j ~il q;(?li +f+flfq 'i:tct II -;;Z'i. II 
a = 5l~fnfq~l'f 1 
43. q&1~<J,r~ f(Hi:G:i;'qT~~mFffill',;fl1: I 
\:fJp:rTm(:'llf+ff8'i:t8 .,. lfffiTSrll1'w:zrf"'l!llf: II;;; <; II 
..;> , ~ ~ 
44. Pravrtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter 
again on the former to produce it. 
45. lf~itr~llr~ "f~T"'~n:T{;ll;:~ ~ qJ'1ffilJ: I 
f~ifiT~Ff~f;:f1~~ fq~T(J aqf~<:Jf:G:8r: II -;;Z\9 II 
(J~ll q!ff ..,. ~TI'lTsfffl, ~ 
a = qf~ut rft:rffi: I 
46. Tbis is the Sautrantika's standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76. 
,17 • ll~)qT~r.,.~m., 
~"'~;:lla- Cfin:ui .,. >!f8qrtlT .,. (J~ll ~ II ~ c; II 
" 
48. This IS the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named 
upadana, eji'. Trimsatika, vel'. 3 with Bhasya of Sthiramati. 
49. erTl1r~C'~il ~ ~teit <1(J ~RC'qTfq:~lT I 
fq;jffifTllTfqlF~~C'CfT8, ~ ~q~:;~ II ~ ~ II 
This verse is cited in Tatt. pan. p. 582. 
50. Sesavadanumana=vaidharmyavat, v. Bud. Logic. n. p. 
208, n. 1. 
51. 5r&1T a gl '[ h: >r~fu~ c f®"Tftr<::fQ(JOlflf: I 
5la;[:a:'oQ<:fQRT?J .,. ~ql:~ ~f.=8 ~ ~T 11 ~ 0 II 
a = ~f.:r~qur+r h, Tib. dgah. mgur. c. lit. f~8Tf~87.1T~+J~T"'T, 
52. srfij'i(NT<:f~T;:"'TlT mt:llfa- ~T"'+f&1~ I 
fq<=rJfq m ~n:?:[8Tf(J ~cf If'[' (JlT: ~~ II ~, 1\ 
- <! '" 
.53. According to the Y ogacara every human knowledge is 
illusive with reference to its object (v. note 31a above). 
1he amhor asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it 
is vitiated in' a la~er stage. 
54. a:r;:1t ~ 9J fCl~H~':lM~T ~+f: I 
~li ~<:ff:q'n::ifm lR[ ~q= <:fT "'Tf~(J (J~ ~ I , ~ -;;z II 
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55. This and the following are the opoinions of Dignaga, 
v. Alam. pariksa, ver. 6. 
56. aJ~1 ;n~e1f(J «mellit"'ii'(iHqf~:r;;~~: 
i'f]1J<H+ntlf+tf(J srr~: 
57. This is the main argument set up by Dignaga in fav;:mr 
of his idealism, v. Alam. par. ver. 1. 
58. f:<f~(Jff{~q 1\ ~ ~ II 
~f;~n:tm 'if~~C'f lNr :q ~UT~.:I{I: I 
~"''fiT <'frC'f~rw~ (Jt:niT;lq f{f:;:~fu II ~ 't II 
f<'f~TfufT YfTUTC'f: ~ I: I 
This verse {s made of 5 lines, the next four lines being 
traced to the original Sanskrit. The implied hew is 
ekaika-apariccheda. 
59. (J~~81UTT~~~<'ffltC'qf,:Pj;{l1: I 
~fqf~~mT~ ~ifrm~fC'f~: II ~X II 
Tatt. san. p. 552 cites this verse with the reading ~~~fcr-;p::f 
for Yfl~-. The Panjika further quotes his comments thus: 
«~.~~ «r:~q'fjq'~T~~rf~~&~~<:f ~~~sfq sr~li1ur ~~ 
f~fC'ftfl{: I (J~ q"{l1M'1T+1fC'ff=:;~;;:r~~rYft ~\T,F1T<:fRt ~~w 
~fu l{Fr~T fu¥fl1T 'R~f(J I '" (cp. p. 199 and ver. l589). 
It is interesting to note the difference in readings. 
Kamalasila thinks that nila is empirically real from the 
Sautrantika standpoint of view but sthula is unreal. Subha-
gupta, on the other hand, thinks that sthula is a real 
substallce rather than nila, a quality, derivative element. 
The idea may be clear if we look into the discussion 
in Kosa, IV, 8-12 on Samsthana. 
60. ~ifr ~r CGlf~f:;;~;;:rm\jjI\ll<;J~i1r «f(J I 
fC'fii~~ mi'ti'f ~ifi~:cFr<:rf{T~ II ~ ~ II 
61. The idea of oneness as i1lusive is explained in Tatt. san. 
ver. 598-9. Similarly the idea of grossness as illusive in 
ver. 592-4 (Ibid). This latter position is of the Sautrantika. 
62. ~: ~~~UR"~ ~rit q(lff1JTC{: I 
aJT~a- itfu C'fT~T ll: «<:(1 n « f~e<:rfCf II ~\9 II 
63. The opinion of Vasubandhu, Vimsatika, ver. 11. and aLo 
of Dignaga, Alam. par, ver. 1. 
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64. ~~T'ir;:r' CfCfT [204 1 ] iflfiCf irolIT~fe:q.:~Cf. I 
mCf fmi (nf~ifI 1lC!. OfT "iifffl ~fi{~: 11 ~ t; II 
65. cpo Alam. par. ver. 2: 
66. ~if6>T its 11JCf: B"ra: ~T;f'fif~~: I 
a- B"F~ffi" a lief SlIm", ~~~IU'frfCf ~ ;jCf: II ~t II 
a :: Tib. hdus. pa. 
Pram. sam. I, vel. 
67. The author thinks that S:mcita atoms are dra vya , subs-
tance since they discharge a uniform function. The same 
opinion in his Anyapoha-vicara, ver. 2. The logical school 
of Dignaga following the Sautrantika standpoint defines 
dravya as one capable of discharging a perposive action: 
artha-kr~va-ksamam vastu-taksanam. v. Tatt, pan. p. 730, 
(18; Nya. bindu Tika p. 76-7.) cpo pram. var. III, ver. 195: 
arm~Tf+rn~;;~Tct \iIl1la- 1l)surq)~ I 
:a<fflT~a- m~CfT~ ~ fiffi1~ ID'f'Jf"l1Of: II 
It may be noted here that the opinion of Sancita:-anu 
as the object of consciousness is atributted to the Neo-
Sarvastevadin, (Sanghabhadra) by Kuei. chi. v. my forthcom-
ing edition of the Alam. par. 
68. ~'fiq(ii~Tf~~T~ if ~m'fimf~Cf cf I 
'" ~l1TU'f: q(ii~1 if 'iTCfTf.~~Cffij' II ¥o II 
69. The same idea in the author's Anyapoha-vicnra, ver. 
7. cpo TaU. san. ver. 870. 
Clflf lHll f~ ~~flf trT ~T RIl~ ~~ B" B" ~~ ;:fq q~ m f~ ~~ar II 
with Pan. citing the Bhavasankrati, ver. 9: if.l itif f~ OfJ+.fT 
~ ~T ~T enffsf+f~~ I Ofro) ~'Iq?la- ~ ~TU1t m ~ ~ar II 
~ffi" ST~fCf: I B"CfqT~q~TCfrm=cf qfiffT ~q~: (~q~&l'IIJl1,) ~fCf mcra, I 
70. ~Hl q~~'fi+fPTt 'iT("lIT'fiH ~Cfr~U'fl1, I 
'" 
~f~~ 6flf fii<tci- f:q(>fTfij~U'fWCf~ II ¥ ~ II 
71. This very instance compells the Yogacara to declare that 
the images that are reflected in our consciousness are all 
false (alika) v. Tatt. pan. ad ver. 20 37: :nR~qfCfft::ffiC'qJm'fiT"{q~ 
~ I Cfcf~ Cfir~<nfffi ifT~~at~;;fitrfCf:' arT'firooqH,n:W~rq:ntif 
qT ~if~Cfr 'l1~cr, I ar;:1lm ~'fi~l1OflfT: qf~~clla- I f~(?fT~~~ 
l:tifif+fTq :nTOfT~'lffaf~ffiC'<.'fTct :ntif(-q ~qq~ttfiHT'llJT iifgCll Of J;ffCif)fu I 
~q11lfiluQllfaf~~cmt :nrOf~Tcllif'fiCll STTcrrTfCf I p. 571, cpo p. 181, 
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ver. 536. ~T~ 'fii fcmT~ .... , A. thorough examination of 
this topic from the Y ogacara standpoint has been made 
by Ratna-kirti in hL Citra-advaita-pmkasa-mda. (v. Ratna~ 
kirtinibandha, K. P. J. Institute. Patna; 1957. 
Dharmakirti from the standpoint of his logic offers thi.:; 
explanation: Our practical experiences dictate that several 
non-sensuous consciousnesses can arise simultaneously; v. 
Pram. var. "FfTM'fiT +fcta a~ f~Tsa-)fq'f>f~T I fq"f>"~q­
~citCfiT~ lRI'TS"l1~fq q~lffQ I "cp. ve;s; Ibid, 197-201; TaU. 
san. ver. 1253; Ofo: ~\7f f"lqif ., ~~ ~ I ~~vr­
+mH~ ~ ~m~iSJNi!ffl I etc . 
.", .. 
Another explanation is offered in the following lines: 
~ lf~ +rrmr m.r m{ a~"l~a- I ~fa o:j'T~ii'lT"l: ~~ f"fflT'fiH~<:f 
~~: \I Pram. var. I1r, 222. Bhasya: aFtRr m~'fi.,r~­
'mifiRT f~T \iff~~fa f:qffi6:"~ I p. 290. 
" 
Dharmakirti further argues as another solution that several 
things can produce simultaneously one cognition: eFT C!lT f"l"(T-
''IT \if'{<t ~f~fa~<:fT: ~iict I ..,~: 'fiT"(uj- ~l[f~ "Tcitf.:rof~ "la. \I 
Ibid. 224. Bhasya: <:f~~lfT~l=Fn'fip:r 3TR'iW~~f~T ''IT 
~'fiff{f.:~lf~~.r \iff'flff.:cr I al!f£ Q'"(llTUfclTsfi:i 1 'fiT f"l"(T~: 1 p. 296. 
Kosa (IV. 10) also refers to the citrastamna problem. v. 
Note _ 178 for the author's solution. 
72. £t1~ ~lfl~itCfirCfiT~~T lff~ I 
~ ~r:qyI';fl{<:fT f~mllliT9i1 aq'lTf~li: II ¥~ 1\ 
a-Tib. bkra-ba--f"l'Vf, variegated. 
73. A similar explanation in T. Panji. p. 571, I. 16. v. note 
178 below the passageJ~<liTCfiT~sf1:r .... , 
74. ~~+r'fiT~l fq"FlfT;:rr+FJ~qyq: , 
Cf~R~ fCf:;:;~ .~~ l1T~lfij 'fi~~, \I )(~ II 
75. Atoms appear and disappear together: ~l~) ~~ ~, 
This is what the Sarvastivadi-Vaibhasikas . conclude. It is 
further made clear in the next verse, cpo kosa, 1. p. 35, 
11. 18-20, and Vis. Mag: if~tifT UTT I:fimT "fCfffi)- ~ "1mT I 
am ij arfcrfUn:if'lllT ~W:qm m{0lp:(J 'I 
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v. my paper on Nilakesi, Annals of Research Institute, 
Tirapati, IV, p. 61. Tatt. sangraha defenus that the atoms 
though invisible individually, become the object of 
perception; v ver. 570. 
76. sW:tlti~yur;:rt H:rTij~17JT~ij";i!Cf: I 
Blij)sfq q~mUFf~<lili1srfij~rn;:p:r, \I ¥¥ II 
<'-
This verse is cited in T. Pnnji. p. 551,1.21: Blqrfq Him, 
ij"~~T ~cf't~q?!;:ff fq.:r~lff..a mij fij"~:F~w.r.fi<ii~~srfij~rn ~fij I 
lpqt'ffilf,. . . . .. I 
77. Bill} f~r'l{rif~C::T'liJ itfu lRL ~ijl1, I 
BlurT f(fefi,~C:: ~ij it<=rf:qa,: ij"fiI:illfU( II ¥'( II 
The second line of this verse is cited in prose in T, panji. 
p.556, cpo n. 79 below. 
78. The author refers here to Vasubandhu's criticism of 
atomic theory in his Vimsa. ver. 12, 14 : 
'le~ '1ifq?!)ifT ~~mur): ~~ I 
lSJ'lllTt ~T~~~:nCl fqu$: ~lfRurl1T~: \I 
, '" fC::i~T~~) lf~qrfffi ij~<f.;;cf <=r ~:jlla I 
Some similar criticism has also been made by him in the 
kosabhasya, L ver, 43. Tib. pp. 81-84. and the Vaibhasika's 
defence. 
79. f~lTFT~m~: argf~: qfoof"{ijT: I 
<f.f~ilT 3fUTCf~-tq <=r q mqlfql~ll<f.T: II ¥~ II 
cpo T. panji. p. 556: +rC::-~~~~q sr~-'l~<f.~=f+rrq~~IIT­
f~O<lTv:r~~ ij"Tm"tj <=r ffi~ <f.~a I ~qf~fq q~l1T11Jo:rT+{~<f.­
qf~~41C::~<f.~l lti~C'lff, ;; ~~<=r I ijqrf~-;; f~q:~~) '1Tlf1RCf CliurTl.f[~i:f.· 
w.m: I ij~Cli~Cj"~q~Gff<Fflti~q: 'ffTfct5l~lfq);; ~l:nq: I it4~urq ~ 
q~urTqfh{ijT f~<f~~qT'6ll"T: I ~ f~i!fCI~'lrq ~fQ ~~ Gl'gf~: 
qf"{qn:ur~m' ~lfq, ;; m~+r. ~fij I 
80. The same idea in the ver. 8 above, cpo note 14. 
81. U:li)S1JT~it ~rit fflfaTSOlf: q~~ifij: I 
'" wlTf'+lI1l1fq ~F{t~m srB"mT <=r nF.JTSUT;;r: II ¥\!j II 
cpo Vim~a, bhasya: a{;:lf) f~ q~roTI: 'icif~'~if) lf1q~'6[)~'iJTiT 
~fu ml~if~~ ufu !li~ fI~J~liEfifll" q~TUT)=t~ lI't~ I The present 
verse answers this objection. 
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82. Oi~Cflf{'ii:lfqf<f(err~;!tCflcci fcr~crffi" \ 
OlJfu~Cfl~f(crlACfii'cf srCfi~~ " ({r::. II 
The idea of this verse is also included in the prose 
passage above cited in n. -79. ol:ffR~'6=,~q~~. This 
explanation suggests idea of manifoldness on the atom 
is imaginary as the ide:1. of the oneness on the aggregate. 
83. ~~~lfjJ ~q <t ~fJIij 1:i~T I 
~ cr Rf~{ij R(if tf~TcrUf~~ \I /( t \I 
84. The explanation is made here of how an invisible atomic 
form becomes a visible gross form. 
85. .r~~l~'ff'3:lTcrlffq~ ~~TI';1:!ij,' 
f*R~T: 9:cf!HiR1l'fT i'f ~m: <fi~'1, \I X 0 II 
86. If the latter proposition is acceptable, the former one also 
will be so. 
87. ~~ fg:~f~(GfT~~ R&sf~ 'if' 
~r cqq<:{f6f~,q ~ cf R~1l II X ~ II 
"'''' 
88. The advocate of knowledge of two and more moments, 
duration is probably the Naiyayika. The Theravadin 
pleads that it exists fur three moments, v, Abh. San. IV. 
89. Atoms, though existing in an uninterrupted series are 
not cvnceive::l as one avayavin on the analogy of 
knowledge. 
90. 5Rlff«n.rr 9'~Tf:qff rrfRif r~T rrm+TR: I 
~ 
~q~,<r.1 sr)niitq1:ierRl~R) i'f q II x~ II 
91. This is in reply to Vasubandhu's criticism: ~PR~~ rrfRll<U 
rrfR: ~i'f' srfRf~~ I Kosabhasya, L 43. This answer implies 
that the author is a Sa,'ltara-paramanu-vadin. 
92. 3fr~~ ~fd / ~Tlff tIl!~q~T 'if fcr?itl 
~FTT f~i'f<fi-.qu2fl~ ~1:i~ti'fT i'f' ~ij 1\ X ~ II 
93. This answers Vasubandhu's query: ~T~ 1fi~ err Vimsa. 14. 
94. ~~i'f'1:i): ~fu:;~;;t ~T~ 1:!1!IT 1 
q~OJI';C{Rr (NT ;:f<fi~+fTq: «cf~Tsfq q II 'J,)f II 
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95. am) 'iRHl <iTf~~2fTq fqfJ~) ilTmrfa lfg"f: I 
EfiT~Tf:q~ori' +I~~q a qf"{IJfTq') il ~a II Y, X II a = parinama = 
hgyur. ba. 
96. cpo Vimsa. 12d: fqu~: ~lI1i'.fOJ~: I 
97. 0Rir~~~'~~ ari~Tl}l oqCff~Qffi": I 
" 
arcT: ~ +lCffa- 'If~mQ~~Tfa:Cf.lf II !I.' II 
" 
98. This makes clear that the author holds the opinion that 
atoms do not contact with one another. Read in Tib. 
reg. pa for rig. pa. 
99. q"{~U111~~1:f ~, a qf~Tfq'a-I: I 
q"{f1JT;Jl}l ~T~;f fCff~ "iCff.~ ~ II V. ~ II 
a-hgyur. ba. v. Madh. vrtti, p, 7. 
100. f~q~l{;:QI~~~ ~) lf~T I 
a ~~:;;~"a-SGTCf: ~f'9a-, ro~EfiC'llT ~~ Hlf" II Xc; II 
a=brgyus. pa l1f~a- S. Das, Dictionary. 
101. 3T;:it~q~fffief~T:; Gff~l1Ff'9~T~rr: I 
~: ~f'3ifcreqvr Efi~~~"{CfiT'lTIl1;:r II X'\ II 
"'" 
102. It appears that there are millions of atoms having no 
capacity strong enough to come into combination and 
to form any visIble object. 
103. The Yogin can count the number of atoms even of the 
hell, etc. remote objects. The expussion: acafadigah 
is again used later in ver. 64 below. -
104. a:reT ilHa-rfa ;it ~11,,; ~. mf~Cf?flt£lf~ I 
~tftt1TQlm'i[T 'ei: a If'lT!;q-~,l1itJ'flSf II '0 1\ 
"'''' ~~TR( mFa-l,lRm; a-~rf~{(TQ. ~fa- :;U1!f: I 
105. The idea may be amplified thus: If my apprehension of 
atoms by outer senses is illusive, your understanding of 
the mind alone with equIly be ilIusave. Here the author's 
reference to the mind as the sixth sense is suggestive 
of the fact that the mind understands always what is 
apprehended by the outer senses. Cpo the Saying; G:T+lfT 
f1l~q) ~ ~ ~F<rnT~il ~iJ l1;:mr :q I cited in Nya-
Tippani, p. 26. 
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106. ~fu~at<:f m am I 
iIfa: ~ifC~ ~Tfd'<R) a "liiRt:, II ~ ~ .II 
q"{ifTlrftVin:rfm~ srcOf~at~ ~T lJf({ I 
Olffa :q mf..wS"<:f ~ b; >imiiltqTfu'I I 
CfiHila:1ffi ' +T<ffa ~ ~trT'fiR~~U'{+r, II£..";( \I 
a=lit. f~ b :::: Of'<l~ will be a better reading. 
107. The Yogacara conceives the mind as the basis of illusion 
of the whole universe; thus the mind is a real entity 
while the objective universe is illusory. 
108. The Yogacara's conception of the hell is weU explained 
in the Vimsa-bhasya ad. 4. Read my English translation 
of the treatise and a bilingual edition of the textes with 
notes from Vinitadeva's commenls (Institute of Tibetology, 
Gangtok, 1964). 
109. The author thinks; As you (opponents) declare the 
atoms, etc. as illusory, why do you not say likewise of 
the" Pradhana and Purusa as illusory? 
110. aa:Cff~n :q ~:Sfnn ifOTTRfq<:fWlia: I 
" '<> 
'\ilf'R.rT RCfif~q~sfq 'l C"fT'TlfT 'icfCfi~qi'jl II ~~ 11 
Ill. 0f1JT;'J a~f~cr a:r~f~mij: I 
a;Ts;::ir.n;ZQ:rCf: a ;;rt'l;::qrfa 'fi~t~ \I ~'6' II 
112. The same expression previously in ver. 59. n. 103. 
113. ~)~~+{f.:r:q+f ~~ lR'lli~ I 
lftr.m lJtcf41Tq19' fillfifTq: ij"~ ilt£tll II \ 'J.. II 
114. T. Panji. explains Jnana-Jlleya-svabhava thus: fqq<:ffqqf<:fl1fctif 
f.:r<:f(l~.na:i=lP1Tfq ij"~)~~m'l<:fif ij"t:l1q~ifcr I <:f(lT m~ ~ qq 
~q: fqq<:fJ{~~~CfifclTUW, f~rfq ~~'q ~ ~cr'lTTCr: I aliT. 
~<fififl+PAitiirifC'<mr fiifli ij"~41rfcreT I 'l:q ~T("q1CJ1f~sfq :q~r'l~ 
f~~:w: Cfmfct~~ I Cf"lT f~ mmf'lJT 'l~f~~m­
~ lftT;i' ~~ 'l :;;r~{I(I'6lJG\ij l~ I 'l~fa:"{fq <I Cf~<:fifTif~q) 
\iff'lijT 'l ~fa:f"{fij I ~:q 'W<:f)sf~ m~'tiT"" I p. 569. 
115. iifi'lf)SRa ~Ofi) lftTi{F! :qf~ fC(tf~~i1T I 
a:r~~ ij"~ fqffl'lT'it;:m:r~f~14): II ~ ~ \I 
This is cited in T. Panji. v. note. 114. end. 
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116. a m~<fii;;;r f~;:f ~T<j efT f~ PI'lT I 
. " iRT ~~ ij~T Cf'ffi", ~llij .,T~ 'ff: II ~\9 II 
a = Ii 1. ar;rT~. 
117. What is implied in the previous verse is made clear here, viz. 
in the absence of either of the two. knowledge or the object 
no cognition flashes out and that is the reason why they are 
felt simultanequsly. 
118. ~<fiT~~Cf: ~~~Cf~n , 
f:qu~'iil'J ~q: ri~'fiTf;:Cf<nT 'l:q II ~t:; II 
This verse is cited in T. Panji (p. 568, 1, 4) in prose: 3T~ 
~Q]&G tzer.~f<:fcfe1m CfGT ~f<ffl1lf~~ f'ilu~~'PJ ~~n 3ffer.Tf;:~T 
~):, 1l!l.TT fer.~ ~a:~ ~rrifDT 1lfiritzi ~CfT'lRr<:f:qu' CWt ~~ 
:q ij"~T~++rf~sfl:r 3T~ltq 'lrrfRGfl:{ I CftlT fqu:;:tuT'lt ij"~fcr ij"~Tcr~~'it 
.fer.('qf+f~Cf)s4'fiTfrij<f,) ~qf~fCf I 
119. arrrriT+lnJ f~CfR{ :;;tURf mf.:~?fT ., ~~, 
fcr~<fipfri1t ~T;:f ~m: ~CfT ~+f: " ,~ II 
120. The author probably intends to say thus: The ghost, the hell, 
etc. are equally spoken off in the scripture, why do you 
say that our knowledge of these things is an illusion? 
121. 3Tij"~q ij"1=*~ fcr~ ~~mG , 
Cf+ffij";g:+ff'l~'&1 qft~<:fu fC{<;;;(~ II \90 II 
122. ~~ ~)~sf~11'l ;fc{T~a<i ~'iT iiif:qq , 
fq~:aTszi mIT ~'14 ~f~ ij"~G;rl{ II \9'1 II 
Kamalasila introducing this verse remarks: 'Cfli{ '+fG:;:~+r~qr~­
f~sll' ~: ~'1~-ij"~Q]&~' .. " This objection is also noticed 
by Dharmapala in his comment an Alam. par, 
133, ~l~: ~Q]&G~~ijTsfu~t ~ I 
Cfi~ ij"T'f:lRor +rTGl tz~;lq :cr ~ II \9, II 
124 T Panji. refers to this idea of oneness and its implications thus: 
Iff: ij" tz<fT~ 1lfG ij"~U;G ~er.T~: UGT ~~f": I aqrf~ 'lc:vir+r~~te1~ 
'l~it~~+f+r) 'lT~: I iflfcr ;:ft~~~+r1l)~~rfeflcrw+r: I u~ 
'lTc:'I)~riTsfq Cf~cr~lm'lT+fi=lR1;:ijr;;rraI'll~~l'+{T~ I 1lG:T:q m:ef (sic) 
>ITUJ+J"aT ij"Cf f"fUe1lJfT: ij"cf$fTGRfTlt"a- I CfGT 'fi~it~q)m+r: fB":{i: ~~ I 
f<MfI~q)q~+m~ ij"f(f ~<fiTq(i'f+m'i1l+f: fij"'61lfCf I 'l 'ilF1l)~++rlif~­
~~q:' fCr~5I1im fC{f~>Ifait~r1l)rr~ , 
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125. ~mn'i~ ri f=q~ ~~~f~ i 
O:~qlqm'+l~ a~}ffi: ~ f~ellf(l II \S~ II 
The idea expressed in this verse is well state in T. Panji. 
passage cited in the previous note. 
126. an~'if¥l~T s;tf: >I11PlTCfTI?l f~lIfa- , 
~q'ff'fCff~'15fl1" ~f~f~;[Cfr acr: II \S'6 II 
The idea of this verse has been summed up in T. Panji. 
passage cited in the note 124. 
127. iSIT~T'*1Tq(l: f~:it FfCfilfTlt f~fCfi~ I 
~(I~' m=>rfij";[t wq f~ II\9XII 
128. Thus the reason becomes anyatara-asiddha 
129. ~f~1 l206 a] ~fimI~ m'e"l!(IT I 
~TCfiFflr'f<fif~;:ft fqq~QJ 'iT '*Tiit~ II \S~ II 
130. For the advocate of sakara jnana, the image is a part of the 
knowledge. To prove it is useless. 
131. ~<fi Q;er q~T~h:i~T~~ ~Cf,~ I 
fl~[~~ Cfi~ ~~¢tq ~ .11 \S\S II 
132. 3NT~+'il a ~5'[~ b ~~~C ~'i~ aT: I 
m~ flT'i~~; fq;;T fqf~ 'i ~~'l1~ II \S::; II 
a=arq~itf1. b. No case-ending in Tib. c. dgah. baL 
133. The author appears 10 mean this: lfthe experience of the 
black sh.ell consist, in the nature of knowledge alone, the 
knowledge should then be experienced as black. Since 
the black colour canot be attributed to the knowledge, 
there ought to be something bJack material other than the 
knowledge. The classical example is: pUah sankhah. This 
example of bhrama jnana seems to be purposely employed 
in order to point out that there are two aspects of the 
object, viz, black and the shell which cannot be accommo-
dated in the only knowledge. 
1 34. 1I~ ~tt Cfif;q~ fCfif~ f~ ~~ I 
'i ~~~ flT'i~qfu~~ ~\i'lf~ II \S~ II 
13 5. ~ ~q[ti ~. =q;:~+n~~ lflltT I 
~TfQJifia-~fl1fu srf~';il.' ffi.1' ~ II c; 0 II 
~ ~ 
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136. I.e. One imaginary form and the other real. Similar objection 
in T. panji. p. 574, ver. 205t. ep. my paper on Bud. Idealism. 
Tirupati Institute, Journal, I, pt. 3. p. 83. 
137. ~ 1l m+rAT >r~T;:f f<!I'~lT~'1fl{ I 
~n~Tcpl!qqq ~ttlfl. it;:r ~ {fQ:~G.'1~ II c;, \I -
This verse is cited in T. panji. p. 569, II. 16-17 along with 
the verse; ;:n;:lfTSf~ ..••.. I-v. n. 114. 
138. Samagri. according to early Buddhist includes three factors: 
(1) visaya (2) indriya, and (3) vijnAana, manaS and it gives rise , 
to a sensation, sparsa, which is foJhwed by feeling, vedana, and 
then image, samjna, v. Bud. logic. II, p, 311, Table, Cpo Kosa, 
III, p, 63, 23. 
139. Here the term saha is in the sense of immediate suceession: 
elr. the next verse, 
140. Tflqr ttf!{1' ffi'1fJ1f..~lf~ Sfqa~ I 
~~Tm'f 8m+!" 'fTtl(f: {f~'fl{ II c; ~ II 
141. ~~q fqm;:rTm;:tt)s~l, \l~+rlrrCfii{ I 
m f{fe'lff(f <it qy~i?{ ~Q)U'iwt; 1I1:;~ Ii 
142. That is, the reason is doubtful> (v. ver. 74 above.) Sandigdh:l-
asiddha. 
143. mo:rfq'tl: ~Cf+lI"kqlq: ~£ia- ~f(f Ofi~a- I 
fqtllfnnfu'fi:.mT~;:;r.;cocCfTjf ~i{ II c; { I' 
144. The idea is made clear in T. Panji, p, 570, /, I8.if. 
'ff~ ll~1;fQ) <rre~ m;:rroR'+!"~~~ ffii!~itqyqf~ I 
f~ (ff~ I fqT+ml1fT'f:jf.,'R~ ~~£i~ I The author probably 
means this mukhyato vedyatva by the expression jnana-vitteh 
svabhavatvat. It does not however follow from it that the 
author means that the knowledge knows itself. According to 
the Vaibhasika knowledge knows its preceding moment and 
hence there is no jnana-sva-vitti. 
145. ~~~~sfq (fG:~: 'I~q f~ I 
rrCfTG:f'ff lJ~ l[Rarm~TCfiT~) ;r Rrcrtfa a 1\ c;~ II 
a lit. at'fri: 
145a. The idea of this verse is also referred to in T. Panji. p. 570. 
I. 20, ff: 
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CfCf"?<i lffl;f ~ ~~ ~C'~lG"Rr~a- I Cf~ ~Cf)~f~~CfT I ONTfq 
lf~r<lim~ ~~~ICSI~<=II"d!laTm1=lfR!' Cf~fq if Cf!i!TTfC'.NTfcttf~f;g: I ifft! 
~)~ll'l'q: if9<lT<iTilT fqmfur~f~fu:, Mukhya samvedana above 
referred to is also implied in the following passage: l(C<=lIC'+I*,'~;f 
~ Cf~~~ltfQ q~lT(Tf1:r 1fT'f!l~crr~T~r~l{ I (T. Panji. p. 568, I. 
12) The Bahyarthavadin of this passage is probably, the 
Vaibhasika (1) 
146. ~cf~~OO-.-ijTifT~'ifTfqCfT: I 
1:ll{ T ltS.f<filfrCfOfiT<:~: w:i~)SCl)1:l<fi: Cf)~ 1\ Ci~ II 
146a. This defect of anaikantika is explained in T. Panji. v. note on 
ver. 68. 
146b. cpo T. Panji. p. 573. I. 15 if. making this same prasanga in a 
diferent context. 
147. ij"ftiiRSfTiltflff 'if ~f~~ ~T I 
~nt~ 'if ~~relt f~~T~ lf~ II c;~ II 
This verse IS cited in T. panji p. 570,1120·4 with this introduc-
tory remark: aN ~ r'il~ ~MI<Q lifiT;( erf~urmf~ m<t'iT~~ 
~sfq WfllWr: I ~ fij4ij l~ifCfT I lf~)'ffil{ - 1 The Sakara-
Jnana-vadin is the Sautrantika. 
148. ~~)~m a~4~ijlO+ld: 1 
lffcf~ ~ 14~t:; R{ aJltG:) "l lffcri'lfCf " CiCi II 
a=73'q:qy~R{, Its samvedana is gauna. The idea is well explained 
in the passage quoted in note 145. This is the tandpoint of 
the Sautrantika also. He is therefore called Bahyarthanumana-
vadin v. my paper: Bud. Idealism. ob. cit. p. 78; Tsan. p. 402, 
ver. mCf~~ CfT~~T'ff{ ~~ ~ I 
149. ~ Cf~T~ riq: [206b] CR"lf~~«I~UJlI. I 
f~ &.1 'ir~ 'fi~ ail. f~ Cffc;:fCf IT Cit II 
T. Panji. (p. 561, 1. llf)cites this verse with this remark: 
~;:a - ~mra~~ : fcrnFf+ATtrn f~'fig;ffq ~ SJfaq~ , a~tff"{'6~l;f­
~CR'crrq: I ~+I'I?lllI:I'i:1 Cfi~Q<lT 'fi~ qf,f:;;~~f~ I f~qq: qf~~rfC1' I 
an~ "tf-l Definition of pariccheda, v. ver. 92. below.-
150. famT"l~tf+l';:iR QljqP:n~1l ~) a 'f!la- I 
Cf,~ q~ ~~ ~qf~:;;~~Of)fr;;rfu II to II 
a=~fln~~ I 
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151. This is probably the author's criticism of the sarupya theory 
of the Sautrantika-Y ogacaras. 
152. ~qf~f~fwtT~~ ~T'1fl:rfi!fff ~ I 
~ ~qfql!Fi m<i ?ffiT~ftf5{~)l'aI 1\ <1.Z \I 
153. 
154. f<rnri CR:;FH~ '1 f.:rflSifilf ~~Na-: I 
fqfwr~ CfiT~ u+rRT14l flr Cfi~lta- II ~ ~ II 
155. Thus the above stated pariccheda of the ver. 89 is simply 
vittimatra. 
156. 1l~'1 ~1 :q ruq ~Tcreff <l1!f[ I 
fCfif~1 ~ ~T a '1~TGT fcr~ff 'fI": II <1. ~ II 
a=ses. pa. gzugs = knowledge-form , 
157. ~cf~~ a-(F~r '1-itGl ~r'1~liija: I 
~Cfi11f\:1l{T ri l1~T~~H) ~~ftRIT II ~ '6 1\ 
158. This is very important to note that the author denies an 
apparent distinction between the Saint and the ordinary man 
in respect of their grasping the external things. The Saint 
has an additional virtue of penetrating into different aspects 
of things; sarvakara-jnana IS one of the qualities attributed 
to the Buddha, v. kosa, IX. ver. 1. 
159. ~TOf;R crT fij~ q;~lfcfir~~ I 
'if6 ~1~stq fcr~f.:t f~'l f:q;:QTA ijqijff II (l,li,. II 
cited in the T. Panji. p. 573, 1. 7 with the explanation: 
T~ ~CfiTUfGf~r~'1 '1T~~ ~tri ~ ~f~ f"iFa-T f~ I ~ fl<TCfaTsftr 
i rit;T~~ ~~ ~ flfi '1 ~ I 
a Read bsam. pa for byis. pa. 
160. SakaraGvadin is the Sautrantika, and nirakara-vadin Vaibha-
sika. The Yogacara is tulya-kala-vadin and the Vaibhasika 
and Satyasiddhi are atulya-kala-vadin=Krama-vadin. Similarly 
Vasubandhu, a follower of the Sautrantika school pleads for 
atulya-kala-vedana, a Suceessive comprehension even of 
omniscient Buddha thus: 
W~ij ~~qK! <l1!frP'1: ,,"",cf41S.l1a-: I 
~T ~fcf~t.iT '1 ~~~~K! II Kosa. IX. 1. 
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161. awfiT~~ lR(fZif tf++rq~ltq ~f;g: I;l: I 
awfi~: tf 'if ~~T Tl~ Wfi~t<.j~ II ~ '" II 
162. We experience different things in different shapes. some long, 
some short, some square and so on. These shapes according 
to the Vaibhasikas are external and rea.l belonging to the 
coagulated atoms. The Sautrantika and Dignaga· school on 
the other hand, hold that they are internal and unreal as they 
are merely our mind's construction. 
163. ~ffi~o~ '3:f~ ~ itfo ;:r wWo: I 
iifiQ tf ~lflTr~~('tf11 a l1f~f~~ II ~~ \I 
a = lit. arllTQro+1' I 
164. The Mahayanists think that the yogin, having removed the two 
kinds of obscuration, klesa and jneya-avarana would not 
have any idea of external things, The author redicules this 
point, cpo T. Panji. p. 574 ad. ver. 2048. 
, 165. f.:r~qurrfu:fcf;T ~fiJ: ~?;J qTC1:I~lq I 
~ 
a 3NTmsfcr«trn:: , 
a ::: lit. aNfsf~ <.j~Tfq~CfTG": I 
165a. The avisamvada argument has already been stated in ver. 3. 
v. also ver. 185. Here we may note the passage cited in T. 
Panji. 574, 11. 20,.lf: aJ?f +fC'l'=o~: Sf1f£1JTllfa:-~ m;:r1'fiT~: tf ~qrf~ 
tff\'l' ~'fTfcrqlq '(q~l~\jff"ffi: ~'Gfr ~1fl :arrfiR:, mi{f<iTUi{PP1~F~ 
i{T<nrf~>lf~l:{: ~cmftfcr ~~: I This prose passage may 
be from his lost commentary on the katjkas. 
166. fofij~~T ~;wtEf1l{ \I tt; 11 
Stf&1Cl'i tMT ~ a ;;T~ ~~ I 
arr{"'tq ~~tr~ q.g:TCfl~~: 'fiTsfti ;;T~ rq II ~ ~ I' 
" 
a = .ft<n1'fiT~: .. 
167. Offut ~Tfcr ~TSfir fq~ ~~l{' 
a{~q!ffifqqqQt f~f;f fllW~ " ~oo 1\ 
168. The author probably means to say what com;titutes distinc-
tion of one knowledge from another in his theory of 
imageless knowledge. 
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169. 1MT f~ 11cf~d SfT'i A1::f.fi~ a~: 1 
~fu :;;rr"ija+rTCfiT~ +Rf~ a~-q fl: II ~ 0 ~ n 
,'" '" This verse is cited in T. san. p. 572. 
170. For the Yogacara the tru~ knowledge is non-dual, adva)'a as 
stated in the next verse and imageless, elr. T. Panji. p. 182: 
~t{f'I"T'l)+rfi:r f;;~f<{~FfCfTf~ ~;gy~ +rfr~fa The images'are 
jmputed by anadi-vasana or saktis formed out of knowledges 
produced by the sensuous objecet for the Sautraatika, v. ver. 
27. above. 
171. am=qr a mfl~ 'iTfC'<i~ f<:f{T~tlT~: I 
3f+@ ~~~ ;:rq '!1~ClT tifr~ ffi! II 90 ':( \I 
a;i; In the sense of a separate image, prthak akara. 
172. a lJ~ltpjf~ci tifr~T ~~ <li~fu ~ I 
[207aJ tifFaTtfir~)scrolJ~ tfi~ ~ tfif~aT ~~q: II '1o~ 11 
a or f-qafifia+J; , 
173. This is exactly what the Yogacara says; this is accepted by 
the author himself, note ~:q m+Rf+rTCfiT'{+J: in the ver. 10l. 
. The author, has, however, stated"'it as kalpita by W:ly of 
prasanga. 
17 4. +Rfa~'f fcr~l;:f f.:rntfir'{~ a i:f~fiI1l 
'" ~ mfa~ qftr-og,~ mrr~T';fq zn.lfcfi+J: 1\ 'lo'l{ U 
a:: lit. 'q~'{Tft{flT I 
175. This is the basic conclusion of the author. The sense-organs. 
for the Vaibhasika, are derivative material elements; but, for 
the Yogacara they are some forms of Sakti. v. Alambanap. 
ver. 7. with Vinitadeva's tika. ep. Satyasjddhi, chap, 45. they 
are nominal. Parieeheda is explained in veL 89-92 above. 
Yogya=an object that falls within the range of senses and 
not a remote one. 
176. sr;ftq-: ~~r;:ft iJj:SI<fiI~I"-'Id 1MT I 
f.:r~T;:f nffO:{~T;J;1iit;:P1'~~ a~ lJft{ II 9" X II 
fCf'{T~: tfiTsfq ;fqrf~ I 
This verse is made of 5 lines in order to complete the sense. 
177. The lamp-example is cited by the Sautrantika-Yogacara!) in 
favour of their theory of svasamvedana which is criticised in 
1\-1ad. karika, VII, 8 and Madh. avatara, my Sanskrit text, 
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p. 60: OfQf ifif~ ~T~TF~z:n.~rr~ I It seems that the early Sau-
trantika, i e. Darstantika does not accept the theory of sva-
samvedana, cfr, Kosa, IX, p. 231, n. 4 ; Vyakhya, p. 698, 2-3; . 
Satya-Siddhi, chap. 68,71,72. The Vaibhasika maintains that 
one knowledge cognizes its preceding one, (cfr. ver. 84. n. 
144, cp, ver. 90, 144 and 147. also) In case of not accepting 
svasamvedana, how the memory is possible is explained in 
Bodhi-avatara IX ver. 246, my Epitom. p. 39, ALB. 1953. 
178. This implies that the simultaneous grasping two and more 
colours, e.g. is possible. Therefore the cognition of several 
colours in the case of cifrastarana is quite permissible, v. 
T. Panji. p. 571: it ~ ~lf~ ~:rr~1lfFlff<fin:~~T;::itq~fil f=q~­
~fa:~ ~rrq~~p:+r<f;:c:itq f"i;nm1lj~~Tf~Ffqfa:fi:f I i:f((i?<f >l~ fu:g:m-
elf~' ~qt f=q~T~~iJr if1~lfT ~q OfTifiTU: ~~ I ~;"nhfq 
f~ffla:TqqTnf~lfqnlTrr~T ~q 31'fcfiTU ~ i:fcm=~ m;rTfq mif+RliJiR'i1cti 
>rfUi1Tf((, ~r;lfi:f Q;q fi:f ~ ·•• .. ·1 Kamalasila probably means 
some Sautrantika author who pleads that several images are 
simultaneously experienced in the case of citrastarana. But 
Subhagupta may not agree with this opinio.n, as a sensuous 
knowledge, according to him can comprehend several 
homogeneous objects at once. 
179. ~~':fra:lfTsm1ill fqf+r<=~fu;:lfrrT=qu: I 
~il ~ ~liJiliJiT: ~:!+rMT if :q 
180. cpo M. l. 295; S. V, 218, cited in kosa IX, 242 ; Satyasiddhi, 
chap. 35. The different kinds of objects, such as colour, 
sound, etc. cannot be simultaneously cognized by theirrespec-
tive sense-organ-ssays the Vaibhasika. The Y ogacara on the 
other hand, thinks that simultaneity of different nonconstruc-
tive consciousnesses is possible as T. san, says; 
~<fi1t~'Q6\~la:lqf~ ~ ~·I 
~ !if ~ liJi~ olf~~ il ~: I 
Ofi:f: ~~ fq~ il §i~ut +I~~ I 
~~~+Tr~ +r~;;:;~;q:rf~etGR{ I (1250.53) 
The same in Pram. var. III, 136-37. 
~~(ffiqT~fl2{~~f!sq~ ~~:fftt, 
...... ~fmC! w~ ~~ fetlf: II 
cpo Ibid. 208: rrRrf~r 1T~ q~ f~sqTSfqiif1f~ I 
fqliJi~qlf~citi:fiTI1f tffiTYlra:fq ~lffu II 
Prajnakara's Bhasya: f~Qf>Tfcr~ffit f~ 'iF'I1'iTzirTf~qiJr I ;:ft~f'ia:flffcr 
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fCf~~'.i[fq qtf;:qCff~qrijTf~cf q1i~Cf I .,:q 'lrrqii{~Cfif~;;;q~r;lfCf: I p.286. 
The last 3entence makes clear that the Y ogacara bans the 
simultaneity of different constructive thoughts. cpo again T. 
san: 3lf.,i)J [lJ): ~ 1 Panji. p. 241: "~<fif~'1'l, <fiT~ ~N­
~q[li ~ef?fit I See also note 71 above. 
181. , ~ ~ II ~o' II 
fCffltt;t'fl1'(Ullfd ~~+i~ a ~11fll I 
a=dmigs, pa. 
182. lffi \3"~ij- ll"n:~ ~r.:i ~<:'{ ~.,;:a-\ll \I ~ 0\9 II 
f~~~fin:i.t [eil1ilTf~T Cf'tf: I 
t'Rf f~ ~ Of, fq~RreT ll"a-: II ~ 0 c; II 
... 
~~SlJTCfKt ; 
183. Here and onwards the author criticises the opinIOn of some 
Sautrantika masters who hold that our consciousness while 
grasping an external thing, moulds itself into an image similar 
to that of the external thing and that this moulding is effected 
in just jmmediately next moment after the external thing falls 
within the ken of the sense-organ. According to Dharmakirti 
a non-constructive mental perception intervenes in the second 
moment and the synthetic cognition (savikalpa) is effected 
with the image-formation in the third moment (v. Bud. 
logic. II, p. 312, the Table) our author here, without taking 
notice of the second stage mental perception speaks of the 
imag.:-invested knowledge as immediately following the first 
moment's pure sensation. 
184. ifA1<fi11:: ~: f 
~f~'I lfCrf'ij JId' :;;rei f~~I!f(f: II ~ oe. II 
., ~ Iqt'f<f~~~ [~fq] 
185. jnanakara, for this author, is grabakakara, clr. n. 16~a. 
186, arf~ ~~~ 1 
'fT.,;:iR ifrf mftf ~it11f ~ W~d: II ~ ~ 0 " 
187. cpo T. San. ver. 2039. ~q~T 'if ~ ~r.:rmrT;:ret ~ I 
188, .,r~T~TlfT~ '" ifrf .,r<nTf~~ I 
~;:~~d' ~~ ~ ~f[I'Ff f~ ~ II ~ H II 
~ mfT~~~ll a:t'f~ ~: ., ~~rj'P{ I 
'" 
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189. arf~~:~c:: l:f~T a-1q1rffi;; [itftR:r~] II <t<t~ II 
~.nc'qfEprm<F rfa-C{; ~T~1ifrrTl:fllJ(iT iff&: 
«r~oq+rT~TSU a ~~:itQ" '1' ~lij; ij~ ~~ .1 q '1" II 
a:: li t. fqql:f I 
190. Causality and objectivity are two chara\!teristics o~ the 
content. 
191. !¥IT q-f;e: a f'lfCfeli~ ~ f9~¥ir~ lJ;<:t :0{ I 
cri;iTT~~f~ fif!;!'~T'l?:f<R:rij: II <t <t ¥ II 
a :: lit. osr.i : 
'" 
192. The kind of nirvikalpa mind that is pleaded by the Sautran-
tika-Yogacara school is not accepted by the author. The 
Vaibhasika conception of nirvikalpa is explained in kosa. I. 
ver. 33. with Poussin's note. 
193. 'if~:q 'lr~~ 'll~ 'lJlf ijf~~ I 
194. 
195. qr~'qTlJfq~ ~~ffiT lJ;'llr'fifq~~~: II <t <t!( II 
i1T~"\i{;:f ~:, if;;:Jl q '2:ml~Umq ~IS~ I 
'" \"J," 
196. This argument is set up by Dignaga, v. Alambanap. ver. 1-3. 
197, ~'llT1fiT~<fi ~ ~!flU'('[~qfufij~ H ~ ~ \ II 
l:f~ ~ I Bt:q;:f mM m&'ijT'llT~Tsfq- ;:YCll~ I 
198. ~ci<F ~~ ;ru;:f arTB+iS!rf l:f,:ftlS~a- II ~ ~\9 1\ 
Cf1i{Clfl:!lij;' m;:y i{Ti1;:a~ ~pf '+Trfu 'if I 
'" 
199. Here 'similar' is with reference to the objective element. The 
idea seems to be this: the knowledge first becomes similar to 
its object and this similraized knowledge becomes the objet 
of its immediately following knowledge. The author objects 
to this because no knowledge flashes up immediately after its 
predecessor. In Tib. or after sna-ma stands for objective case 
governed by the verb hdod. pa. 
200, a anq:~ ~r&<i ~ ~qm~ ~f~ II <t <tc; II 
~ C'~*'~rfq ~ ~ ~ , 
a-Tib. mjug. thogs. suo 
\ 
201. The author's objection appears to be this: Suppose in the first 
moment there is a knowledge of the Sound and in the next 
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moment a knowledge of rupa arises in its continuity, This 
second knowled~e must bear the image of the sound accord-
ing to your Sarupya theory. Therefor it is not well founded. 
202. ifif"f({1'~fij,('lt$1I'1fa!if~fm: bfcrq1Tf~crfcr II ~~t II 
~Tq:p.tTrmJ: ~f'O)~ ., "1i.l;tf;:'S::lf~f~ l 
a = lit. ~if<fi. b. lit. 31T~if 1 
203. See T. San. ver. 2083: ~ffiTcr.,;:.~ ~f.t ~:qt~ f~ft=~fcr:, 
Panji. ~~.:a~ ~Ff ~fcr Olff~~~1, 3{;;;:~ m'f '!{fcr ~+r.r~~ 
arr~it ltT ~fm: CMlfcr~T~hrfa-+TrB!>f~f~crT I 
Sakti may be considered alambana as it arouses the know ledge. 
v. note 40. Sakti-alambana theory has also been referred 
to byVinitadeva in his Tika Alambanap. vera 8. V. my forth-
coming edna 
204. l,fr~ fcrqlt(fq f;;<tll'T~ f~f~fij: I( 1,\0 n 
m'iffis~~fri: 3{f~ ~!ffur+f~Cfi'" I 
205. a~~f'O) ~1fcfi~T ~ ;:rr~~., g: f.,t~crr II n~ II 
~!ff.".~r::~:q m~l=ifi Cfi~ ~ I 
a::::Tib. mif ~~'jg' I 
206. The Characteristics as stated before (note 190) are causality 
and objectivity. Sakti may fulfil the first but not the second. 
207. m'fi;;~+i 5fc:lf qt~~t( f~ II 9~~ II 
'RT,1ffCfT ~l/a- =if ., ~l/' mTf~ g: I 
208. This is the fundamental doctrine of the author, Vaibhasika. 
209 mf;;l!f~~q~ ~T iiIl~ffi ;; II q~~ II 
f=tf'Ql1T~~f+ffcr amt:q;gf+fc{ [ cr:q:] I 
210. The opponent thinks that there cannot be any thing in the 
external Hke desiarable or undesirable; for, what is deSIrable 
for one person is undesirable for another, v. Bhavasan-
tika, p. 39. 
211. :§::~fm ~f~f~ ~fG alllcrf'l\Cfcr: II 9'f~ II 
~rq ~f~f!fcr+r.. I 
a ~ lit. +TTcr~-The case-ending is not in Tib. 
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212. The idea here and in the following seems to be thi,,: 
The Y ogacdra thinks that the yogin can change any thing 
into another form by dint of his deep meditative power 
or adhimukti, cpo Madh. Avatara, VI, 69. ~~mc( f.t:;~ lIlf.-r.n 
f& 'li~~~Tqf.:r~~;f lffi~' 
213. aN I q.;T~f.:rnTfu mrt C1cW1rFC1~l1, II ~ ~!( " 
ar+=l{T~:~~qTf~ Ci~l{~al +rctq, I 
214. sftfC1Oljij<1f~'C!FfTmqr~r~Kl f'l1~T a 1\ ~~\ " 
ONT'liRr?,; ;:f~fu ~ ~ '1'1: 'liQl1, I 
a:::Tib. bye-brag-dbye. 
215. 'arHTqr~ ~ ij;:r ~~;:p.f~C1T II ~~\9 II 
Cf)~ '1.,.,'Nqm, f~f~"{m'5fil:lRm I 
~il~ '" Ci'ii'Tf';ij; 
216. at~ .;qr.;Tq~T(f'.IC1, II ~ ~ t:; II 
fq.;T f~T wmnscif':f.l:ir~:f<n~C1: '1'1: I 
~T'l1Tq) ij~~Ci cp:t 'liTfu;rt:rr~Ci: II ~~t II 
iiiT~~f~~ '1 <;I"C\llt a f+Tarr~T<1fCf'l1TCfCl: I 
Cf)fn"f~s~'l~~,; a:::: Tib. log-par-ses-pa. 
217. Svapnopaghatavat, v. note 221 below. The Sautrantika-
Yogacara's definition of reality is: at~f'5fil:lro+T~~ui q~ I 
Nyayabindu, I, 15 ; T. Panji. p.730, I. 16 : ~li1Tf.:a'li<1if;; ••.... 
l{~2Tf'5fir.rrCFTf"{ ~q qu:JT~~q, ~ ~~rCi~~ ....... 1 
'" --
218 . 3Nfqrca-"{~fq :q II ~ ~ 0 It 
f~r~f?filfr Cf;rit Cife:~~sfq fq~ I 
f'5fim+TTiI~l{ ~~,:f., ; 
219. This is already pointed out in the previous verse. 
220 [208a] ~~ Cf;T+T~l{ ~flSeCil1, II ~ ~ ~ II 
~~T~~ f'1ijaT "~Ii~+TTiI~ I 
• ~Ci: Cf;TBTq~T'l1: ~T~ 1 
221. This is given as example to disprove externahsm by Vasu-
bandhu in his Vim",a. ver. 3 a: ~rr)qt{r~ iic:<:lf'5fim I Bhasya: 
fucitfCi ~f~ac;ijl1, I l{~T ~cif e:l{~llrqfull~~\'1f ~fcm~: ~qtfffi: I 
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222. ~riil;EWf ~'::F~]lT<:rr: II 9~':( II 




<:r~ ~qrfct~qTG: ; 
91rr+r;:zn ~~ <:rfG 'I n ~ II 
<fiT+rT~T'if ~'j:+ffi , <fi~r~ ~~'C{ffilila: I 
<>. 
"~~.-(f~TG1f~; 
fq~T<:rTfq:q <ftfqer+r, U 9l't II 
cr ~f~ ~ <fi~if[~ ~qti'{'C{TCf~ I 
'" ~"{':ifGfT1'.i1R; 
~FrT~ ~~ ~l+l'EI II 9 ~ ~ 11 
q~~: ~ ~er erO" q;:r;:f ~ '(Ir+Rt I 
'" ' '" 
226. Bio yi-don :;: buddher arthah probably is the same as kamartha 
previously stated in the vel'. 132, note, 220, i.e. purusartha 
purpose of human action. 
227. ~T~' lJ~T ~tm' ~C!lT"TTGlJ~ it It '9~~ II 
~(lffi: ~if ~1l~ f~~f~ ~/!fi'+r, I 
228. The definition of action is: ~er"T <fiB" ~~ ~flJc:rT :q 
corresponding to paJi A. HI. 415. Ref. Kathavatthu, p. 
393. Madh. kar. XVJTr, 2-3, J\1adh. Av, VI, ver, 89. cited 
in Boch. Panji. p. 472-Poussin, kosa. IV, n. 3. since there 
is no cetana, will in dream, there is no real action. 
229. >rT"ffiOfifff<Ji'l1T;jfTClT ~;:q) a ~91CfRlJ: t I 9 ~\9 II 
. " 
aferr fq~fHl1Tqf b ~~., OfiTt~f':fi1T ftcr :q I 
f:q~+rF?T1fmsf~~l{ ; 
a:;: lit. er~T .,~Cfiql~G<r: trf..cr j 
b ::: lit. fq~P:;c:IlT<fiR+n<i't 
230. The author refutes the Virr!sa, ver. 4..... . . .,.~~ T1: I 
~ (' ' .. ~ ;:f~qT<!?TfG ({~if ~ ~ G[T'C{ij I 
Bhasya : lJ~ .,{~~ ;:rT~OfiTurt ~<fi~rf~~;:f ~;rrCfiT~­
f~ ~+r" sw.ITllm<:r~cfT~Tmr.,~~:a­
~Tfrm~~., ~~T?J ~~4q ff~ ~~ f~q~ffiflq 
"~CfiCfT~rf~ ~+rT"~'-fi~fqt{T~ThTqc:lffq" i 
23] . .,r;:rTCifit~~ II "I ~ c; II 
~T.,~fue'GT .,~~ ~!fter 0" I 
'" ~:~) .,rf~, 
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232. Vasubandhu and other Yogacaras deny the existence of 
other living beings cpo Ratnakirti's Santanantara-dusana, 
K. P. T. Institute, 1959. Dharmakirti however, does reverse 
it in his Santanantara-Siddhi, v. Bud. logic I, P. 521, 
P. 521 ff. 
2 G. a-~T f~~i:l II n~ II 
~1uT~~ ~)S1~Cf'RCfi: I 
fq~kCiq"'4~ fCfWt, 
234. Reference is probably a Garuda-mantra promising the boon. 
235. qcra-;w fer'lT 1Ri: 1\ ~¥o II 
aNf~T i1 ~ ~f~'ff'lim i1 6T I 
236. Purvatantra, rituals containing the Buddhist Tantric rites 
described in Tantric literature as to how one may ward 
o.ff the influence of the evil spirits and gain earthly prosperity. 
Here reviving the dead person cannot be accomplished 
without the assistance of such rituals. 
237. !f\f'iif~) mrtlllf~ ep~ '>l~ II ~¥~ II 
238. Vasubandhu contends that para-citta-jnana is untrue, v. 
Vimsa. ver. 20, but is true for the author, v. ver. 148. below. 
239. ~~:q'l"' ~~iJq ~Ti1' f.:rf~ f~ ~~ I 
~~q [en] a~~ fqm-f ~n{cf. 'f~ II ~'1~ " 
240. This is said from the standpoint of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras. 
241. ~folt'FiW('fCfisrr~ o~Tqn:~ ~~) ;:r 'iif I 
~i'~uw+{ ; 
a = Tib .. gan-gi-mjug-pa-thogs-su-hbyun, cpo ver. 173. 
242. The author probably refers to the Naiyayika's theory of 
of rasmi moving towards the object much criticised in the 
Satya-siddhi, Chap. 49-50 what is termed. Olllqr~ (vyapara) for 
Dignaga, Pram-sam I, 9, T. Panji. p. 399: 
243. CftIT m;f ~~: If ~~~ II 
~ ~~'fii1 ~,~ f'iif~f~ ~ I 
244. Sva-citta-jnana J knowing one's own mind is possible in the 
same manner as paracitta~jnana is. This is not, however, 
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sva-samvedana, self-knowledge of the Y ogacaras, but simply 
one mind knowing the other mind. 
245. ar~ftCff:q~;" I ~11i ~~~rFi(lllfre "<f 11 ~~){ II 
~ ~)~ ~T1~;f ~ ~: I 
246; Memory is not a perceptual cognition (grahu) , v. Pram. 
Sam. 11 8. Read Bodhi. Panji. p. 401-2 explaining it without 
accepti.1g sva-samvedana, cpo Satyasiddhi chap. 91. same 
explanation of memory. 
247. ~:p:~:elJ)"<fug:"cw.lW{T~n.,Cf: ~: II ~)(!l. II 
arij "T~ a lf~tti' Cf~[lf~cr~ ~)'iI'''l{ I 
a = Tib. don-bsin-min. The same expression in Vimsa. 
Tib. version. 
248. cpo Vimsa. p. 10: .... lf~ I . ~f~~rr'i+( I Cf~ ~ lNf~~ r 
ar~T'1ffl~ ~:e~m:q\: II ~ ~ II lf~T crf'?[{f+r~Tc~ilTC'+r'1T ;~T"t lJf:q~' I a~ 
crolRT~ I ~+ri:f" lf~T~ fCffl~fcr+rHH'QT m~~ifif~~~l1f~I~ I 
249. ~Ti=til <;[ij[~ll'fcr ~~'l m~ll~~ II ~ ~~ II 
ij"<t~ : SJ)~ ., f~~T~TCfi~~'ml , 
250. This is the Vaibhasika's conception of Sarvajna. 
251. aTf~i~~~qr~ ~~ff ~Q" 'li'fCi'9: II ~)(13 II 
ar;:lf~ ~~. lI'a" ffii", fil~ ~ fCfill ~Cfilfff I 
ar;:lff"<fDqf~~"~1 
252. Dignaga's theory of anirdesya' in Pram. Sam. 1. 5: 
~~'Wlf"~l!:q ~fllf.SflflJ)~: I 
253. ffi+fT~R?i;:if~li{~: II We; II 
f.r~:~Gi B"<lf'iffl' 'lTfuf, CfQ" lff~ ~~f~ I 
., ij"f~fcf-w <;[~'1 ~~~ Cfi~ ~il' \I ~~~ 1/ 
254. In the absence of an object nothing could be regarded 
as cognizer of it v. n. 249-50. 
255. ro~ffi1TiIf<rnT~~ m~ifit<f ~ I 
~orf~lllCirf<.f#'Tinq wfmll ~~qcr: II ~ ~ 0 11-
~TQa- ~~ 'I~ Cfif~Q ., ~l.lT~ ~rRTQFroill{ , 
256. att;:~#I,.,qliiH:~ if ~)tr ~ftM;:llCfl{ \I ttX'1 II 
Cfi~ cr~q ftqrM fcmlJtllT~~~+r, I 
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257. ~ ~~ffi"f ~qTepr<~'illa II ~x':( II 




258. ay~ .ri!tfCf 'fil}l'i'f I 
~T~r";:lJ~ SlT~At ~~1fa-l!q a ~f~Cfll I' W ~ II 
a ::: Tib. der. sdugs. so. 
259. This probably refers to Kumarila's objection. 
260. Slc=tr&l~Cf)f;;rlfCi' a ~~J1n'fT<filT~<mt: I 
7J11TfGGlqijl"~r f'iaF~ b qf"(~lJ~ I' ~Xl( II 
a ::: ] i 1. fOlift'~srfd'f1.fl'llTq.;T« i='lli!fT({ I 
b ::: lit. f'iffi'=crqf"(1.fllf: ~i='llCl'fcr I 
261. ri ~ en~f:q~ iimepi'{ififl1C'tTer: I 
fep~T<fillfT !Wf a 'i 51 Cf"ttf~ 'iff(\" b: II 9 X ~ II 
a :! Qf~it b:.:: a:rq~: 
262. ~rlJfl1~q trq: ~fOf tJ:ffiT<fiR!l iKf fJ: I 
a:rTOliT"(ifll'i~'U)' 5!'fCftfw.r ~. ifi'~ll II ~ X ~ 11 
a:: lit. srfcrV{ I 
263. This probably refers to the Sunyata-meditation as interpreted 
by the Y ogacara. 
264. EfiT+f"(T<r 'llTql:JCfT "(Til1.flijT 'i 'iif I 
[~q= 'tfTqlfCf: ~TG~rof~' Cfl>.TT T I ~ X \9 II 
265. ~ ~Frt;rr+rT€ttlj [209a] ;:f"(~CfiTf~TCf'iT I 
a:r[~ ~Q~ 'iifFNT cr~TCRT .,f€[ \I 9 Xc; II 
266. It is interesting to note that the author's statement to the affect 
that our idea of one entity (bhava) in as assumption on the 
discrete atoms. 
267. f'ie<iT~~~~~ a +ffCf~Tl1tqf<iC'lreT I 
~cr1q~fiii'eT'iTf~i:J: ~:ac:errfij"(~Cfir II Wt 11 
a:: add. a:rT~ I 
'" 
268. ~f1lii:Hf(~: ~~ftf 'iif f;;-f6ifilJ: I 
orrq~T~ 'iifl:J~ fq'iT wcrf+ftSlJa- '11 ~ ~ 0 II 
'" 
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269. It is historicaliy true that the Bucfdha obtained his enlighten-
ment as, a result of long practices and effort. That enlighten-
ment can not be obtained very easily and in a moment by the 
Yugacara. 
270, am: ~~ Cfl~orT af~crrlRl': Ti: I 
~~illf'iflff:q;:ijffi: ~j<Iij qqfll&R1 II t\'l II 
271. The author has summed up here how Buddhahood should be 
secured in the system of the Vaibhasikas. 
272. ~ ~')~Qqm(7f~ l'{T'iTfqqf~~1l'Jll I 
~<t 'i f~ afllR! ~4cGI'?J ~ «1=~~CJ: I r ~" II 
2 7 3. aT~~w.r~T~ fq;nf8f'ilIit~ :q , 
qTmGRr'firf~"'r :q ~f4~ lIfq 11 '1 ~ ~ II 
"" ('f(,,>rflf~lwrr~T+"'i.fp:rTffmq'l'?f f«el:lfu r 
~?!~: <1i~q'iTllr~' ~ qf~'fim'1l{ I' '1 ~ ¥ 11 
274. cpo Vimsa. ver. 18: 3'Ri)~f'i:lCffa~~ fcr;nf(\f~) fi:r~: I 
275. i:{T~T'!ifaCflfcr;nrij ~lIffl ~aq]Tsfq:q I 
«~cr~ Ofi~f:qCJ: f<f.~ ~ <nf~~'q"fcfl:ft:JR1{ f{ '1 \ '" IT 
276. OT>r+fM ll~~R +fTfcre-sfq f~ lI)f<Im~ I 
,,~:~~m~Tf": 'q5Il~~~: ,j '1 ~" II 
277. ri~t «ci~ ~ '!iq«Wi>l~i1r I 
. ay~R=iFfT;r -irosfui CT~T~''1f~i{ II ~ 'i., \9 II 
278. See. Bodhic. avat. V, 86 and Panji, citing the authority 
of ,the Bodhisattva-pratimoksa. 
279. qf~f;:p.frur+{ffi ~fW'T l!CT'fiTftri!fi: I 
..... aT ~~f~HT?J Cfl~ ~: q~w(if'fir: 11 '1 'i. t:; II 
280. cpo Trimsa. ver. 24. 
281. lJfir ~T ~ ~fa ~dIm1f~fu: ~~ I 
'iTa')aQ'i4i(<1f~ ;;Ri ~~TfCfl'fil{ a II '1 \t 1\ 
'" '" 
a ::: lit. 3l~Cf,~f:;pr;:a =sin-tu-hjig-rten-thal. 
282. ~ailn.'q"T fCf~~ wa~~ ;;rraUifOfi: I 
3l~ llT;:f ~) "l'CI lSf;g:T :q Cfl~~~ II '1 \9 0 1'1 
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283. Tib. nan-thos-grol pas-rnam-dag-gi .. 
Sravaka-moksa is the highest perfection attainable by any 
disciple of the Buddha. . 
284. ~f~ 5fii{;:~a); ~Tq: ~a:sa: [209b] f<fl~ ~~ , 
a~ 'Ii'f~Trr~ c1i~ BlRJ: qf"{f'fqTa: II 9\99 II 
285. A tentative interpertation. 
286. Olf<lff~ ~)~TC'lI1 cfT~Tf~)~f~l{ , 
\j~aT~ f"ftit{r~q~ rrrf~ a l:TffiaT If 9\9~ 11 
'" .::> 
287. ~\lf~TFfTrfi'a{a ~I;f fi'f~a~~'nR I 
a~Bl ~a)~~ <flTlT, frr~)sfq;; fm 1\ N~ \I 
a:: Ses-pa-gan-mjug-thogs-su. cpo ver. 143 above. 
288. cpo T. Panji. p. 180: ~~~qfi"~~ <RI, +ri3fRr ~ ~<flT~f~!1~ I 
289. a~sr;;:rr<flr"{Cfi ~l;f fer;;r ~~fQ-ij~ I 
ii{~ ~f~a- f:qiT W~U'llTfu~T ~~ II 9 \3't 'I 
290. '1 his prasanga has been mnde, because the knowledge of 
smoke is 110t concommittant with the knowledge of fire: this 
will become clear from the just next verse. 
291. 3Tfirr~Tqrf~ f~' 'el11'CfT<flR1lT ~f~ I 
'" 3T~~mT ~ ~)~: ~a) ~~ II 9\S!( II 
292. aR~~~(fT ~f~ <flRUr I 
~c!1:q~; I:[ffBl f:qrrSC''fqQ" rsfr'N"T: II 9 \3\ II 
293. >rfaq.:~S5ff«~ :q <fl~Tf~ ~ I 
3Tft:rS>[Q~tU;t' <fl~ ~aT "$lCfffa II 9 \3\3 II 
294. ara: <flf~!W1rf~ f"Rf~JQt f(?f'CfT~Cfi+{ I 
~fCf ~+l'rfli[~ wi ;; ~~+rqffi II ~\3c; II 
" 
295. The author, from here, attempts to offer his own interpreta-
tions of those passages which speak of cittamatrata. 
296. ~f~ U~Rlft ~r: ii&l'hJ;flt :q Cfjnqa'll 
~)q)qm~ CT~+n~a ;f~W:I:l~ 11 ~\9'<, 11 
a : lit. mit I 
, 
296a. This is ~he. author's· explanation of Dharma-nairatmya, a 
M ahayamc Idea of the external things. Thus; according to 
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him all the passages decla ring dharma-nairatmya are to be 
understood in the manner indicated here. 
297. ~fq ~m >rTffi' ~ ifT~fCfCfifuq~1 I 
... ~:q+JT<lr?if .t qr~ ~fii; ~rll, fCffl1T!StT~ 1\ ~ t:; 0 11 
298. cpo ver. ifTWT if f~ 'l=Im tT~ ifT~fCf<fl;:;t;~ I 
CfHFfT~fc~ RRr+rm;mi ~5' II 
cited in T. Panji. p, 14 and Subh. sangraha. 
299. 3Ff::crUq~ <f,HCf}Tf~f;;-~~ii: I 
iiC'tTr.,~ qf~~ I 5'ifR'l1TqT~ ~ II ~ t:; '! II 
300. Pudgala-nairatmya is also accepted by the Sarvasti-vadi-Vai-
bhasikas. The author here puts forth the reason for 
accepting it. 
301. ~~~trvT <f,~~ fcrCf}~q(l+t I 
Olf~zmt ~aT~ ~qffi ~ ~c:5!!l1Jll{ II ~t:;, \I 
mcr+Ili;( <f,f;:;qa;:sr [~~] "ilC::T fCf<f.ft;qa+t I 
~iJP.IT: )("ilc::rslt ~s«fu if ~~ II <t t:;~ \I 
302. It is well-known that the Yogacara accepts three characteris 
tics, (laksana), viz, Parikalpita, paratantra and parinispanna, 
Likewise this author enumerates three things, viz kalpita, vikal-
pita and dharmata, of which the last one is explained as svalak-
sana corresponding to Parinispanna of the Yogacara. Kalpita, 
a basic entity, Le. a bhavamatra may correspondto Paratantra 
and Vikalpita, a false aspect imputed on may correspond to 
parikalpita. Thus according to this Vaibhasika author as in 
the case of the Y ogacara, two things, Kalpita and d1larmata are 
true whereas vikaipita like parikalpita of t le Y ogacara is 
untrue. That thevikalpita is untrue has already been pointed 
out in the note 297 above. It is entirely false in as much ::;s 
fancied by worldlings. cpo ver. 40. fcrifi~q(l?if ~QC::Nl ., mGT-
f;.s::~~fu I Dharmata, is an ever1a~tingly true as it is the same 
as svalaksana, an everlasting svabhava, (svabhavah sarvada 
casti .... ) Kalpita that is explained as bhavamatra, a basic 
entity probably implies atomic foundations on which the 
various things are fancied. Atoms are kalpita, i.e. infered, v. 
ver. 64, (n. 111). why the separate atoms are not cognized is 
made clear by the author in the ver, 44 (n. 76), though the 
aggregate atoms are cognized in their svalaksana, v. ver, 37. 
(n. 62). 
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303. ~fit ~ 1l""l1Jj'ft{ ~q-~: ~~ I 
~fiTm ~l::fff ~~ ~!fRijf+flSl::fa II ~ C;)( II 
304. This is said probably with reference to the Madhyamika 
standpoint. 
305. ;i'r~ierr~ ~@iI (2 lOa] mCff €f.t tF{ \TTCf ~ ij': I 
apl'(Crr~ ij'Cf~ a 'iT ~fQ~ ~~ 11 'l t;~ II 
a Tib. dmigs-ma-yin. 
306. The author's repeated argument of reality of the external 
things is avisamvada, a non-contradicted experience, v. vers: 
3, (n. 5) 19 (n. 31) and 98. (n. 16~). 
307. This refers to the Madhyamika's position. The sentence may 
also read thus: their experiences resemble the dream, and 
[therefore] are non-existent. 
308. errWT~CfT~: ~ af""~tfiCfTf~~ t 
f~ ~~ 'iT err fcrcrr~rcJ: qftJiCIT: n 'lc;~ II 
a = lit. f:q'ij'liT?T t 
309. ;:~F.JFlffllftRr~ ~~ ~;:ff~ I 
~er~~f~cHTc=<:fFrt ~fuclt ~<mI II ~ C;\9 I' 
310. m'i'ifffiT +ft~eq=ij': a ~aT ;el: I 
am:q)ecf ~ ~at +rTif h li~: ~ c <!~ 'I 'l C;C; II 
a. Tib. mnon. mdzed. cin=~~-
b. Tib. skye. ba glen=li~: 1 
c. Tib. 1C:~'~~' dwang-sig. 
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1. This introductory sentence in not found in the Snar-thang 
edna (=N.) 
2. N. --~fN~' ~ 
3. N. ~::!J(r for 1J'~' 
'..:> 
4. Peking (=P.) ~'::]C::' 
'..:> 
S. P. ~. 
6. P. -- for --~~.~. ~';f' 
7 .. Pi q~~' 
8; P. ;f' 
9. P. ~~. 
10. P. c:-. :rJ' 
ll. P. -~"1.t.!' 
12. P~ ",~.~. 
13. N! <:'-CN~' 
14. P. c:-. :rJ~' 
IS. P. ~'cr ( 1 ) 
90 
16. P. - C' +f'~'~' 
17. N. -t:f]~·.q~r 
18. P. q~' 
19. P. ~~. 
20. P. ~. 
21. P. .Qi~· 
22. P. ~t:. 
Verse 95a: Read - for ~~~'--~~.~~. 
., d " Read q~~'Q' =Wffi' for 5~r.:r ifTVr 
TIBETAN-SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 
(Figure refers to the verse numbar) 
J~J ~~T 68. 
~t:' :q 68, 101. 
~".~~ ~QT 81. v. ;t..It:2.l' "'" 
-~~~' artn:&'fOT P. 
... 
~5'qq: 
--'"' F·.q 1:\' ~: 101. 
- '"' '+f<fflTlT 101. S~'~· " 
~6~·9~·~~~·"t:· ~T.,~mrT 68. 
~t:(.r~~r~6~·t:2.lI:\t:' or"~sfq fcmR 95. 
I:\§o.t fq~l{ 35. v. ~~~~r'J; ~'2f 
~::: «<t 29. 
~t:.'9~,r~~·~~·~·C\:!J~·q· if;{ flmf" ~~~ 8ld, 
'" 
~~·Cf~Oi·~~'~·ar,,·~· l{~ ~~~ 71. 
:!l~'cf,~~'~~~'~ll~'C\~'q'fll' arf~~;jfm1<rn"~ 3~, 
"" '" ~q'~' ~~ 87. v. ~'''t:.' 
"" z:Jq''J'z:Jq''J'~''''''~J:\' fu~T'1~m '+r~ 87. 
'" '-.:> ~ '" 
C\ CllC\' ~C\ t:.' ~ 5\' ;fq........ fJiRo:, 71. 
C\~fll'ql:\t:.·~~· f.:rq 71. 








-'l' ~Wif 29. 
~'o:J'F~'~~' ~ifiT 81. v. ~'ll~'.q' 
~~'2f~~'5·o..§~·'l· ifMq~+r: 35. 
-2f~~'i'll~~'§~'~~' ;;T~,- if"rmi~: 66. 
3' ~~.~. efT 95. v. ~~'::r 
~.~~. R;-<Kf. 89. v. ~.~. 
=-- ..... eo- t::- ~ ~'CN'S~' I"tI =ifififR[ lor fifi'1 95. 
tlJiStlJ· ~ifi. v. 5~' 
-~~'if~' ;;T~ 66. 
v. ~~.; ~C::'; ~~. 'f 
v. ~~ 
'-'> 
<r¥tT 35, <r~T ~ 101, ifi~+r 89. 
" 
.... .. • ••• ~~. <r~T 101. 
~.~._~.~~.~~. ifi~ ~ ~~ ~fu 89~ 
Q~'~~''l~' f<mmr: 68. 
~e:~'~~'~~'~' ~Jft+r'\ 71. 
~~~. v. ~Q')' 
~~')' ••••••• ~'f 29. sine skt. v. ~'2f 
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pro. genetive, v. ~"'t'~~' 
'..::> 
.. "'" _Q·,q5.~r~6.rn·~~·~~· 
"'" _;S~'~t:. f.nJ<p~ 101. 
~t:',q' f;;~T~ 87. v. ~.~"" 







~~r::: Offfit' v. "'t:'~qt:' 
-5=': ~mt v. ~~'Q~' 
a::t.~~.~~. ~rf;:ff'li");; 68. 
"'" 5:J'~~'if ar~1=~q: 44. 
~F-S~' arf~C<fT~ 29. 
f:'. ~ C' e--.. f<~""~~""" \~r ~ ~~'''' Q]I.J'~ t:'6.f'~ ~~' S"" "IGII tll41 fqQ:~<m1.. 29, 
~ ~. ;:rTffit' 66. 
~' iR;; 71, 81. 
-9'~"" ~ 87. 
ia::t'~'5'- lf~ 29. 
t'Q]~·Q·~·6.f·F~''''t~f ~fti~. ~ ~T1flJ'T 81. 
J!J Ji,~?)t)t..E~.E{ I 6'2 .E..lI ll! lJ I ---.!I.5i)J P 1l 
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.. ~ n '~.li 9J JI{ ~ .li '"C:S ~ ~, 
At;; ....... n 0 .LO ~'--'" "'1 0 
'm ~.Jl -=~,.' 0 )t 0 ~ ':'! ii, «n ~{ Ji ~~' ~,' I 
o oll 0 1 .5»J..et 
.lq .!!' (lJ I llO OJ .l:! n c:u?" OJ hi <llJ (.)lI 
". 0 -" .... 0 ~ ~..q .....LO ..J1 :1 1l o~, ~ .E? illH 0 ..c!I." ~ I 1i ~ o~,q VJ 'la o:::lj ()tJ '-"2J J~ ~. ~.. 0 VI ~ l2!? .L.i' • .' ~ "' • t 0 .J! -..J l! .J! 0 ~ ~, 3l' 0'I.tr4 AI ~ 31 
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__ 0'1 0 -"I 0 \0 
VI • '"C:S ~ ..t:j> QO Jl 
• ~........I::f' ..q ";;T) :-" )fl'.E~ \0 
o ~ -:n -.. ~'n
':'! ~ 0... i ~ IJ..[jI ~ VI 
.-'! ~ 1.1 0'1 ~ 6~ 
'{!3 o.? -;J"j. ~ ?' 0 
~ ~ ().11 ~ ~ ........ o JII _
.lq •• I~~' 













~. pro. locative v. 'l~!:r; :;'~r'l' 
~ 
~~''l' 5f~Ff 81. 
~~'.:.J.~. lifFf 101. 
_:r~~'~u~r5~'rlr~' ~l'li~1"l 'lilT :q 87. 
-:rllt~f ~fii'Tq, 66. 
"'" - ~A C<fif<{ 29. _~~·rJ.r~Cij~f' 
-S' pro. ~. 
~::~'~~r~6~'9~'~~~'~C:'~' ~~~fii'~mTT 68. 
-~6~'rll~C:' if)~f'l fq~f.r 95. 
~~. qr 95. v. ~~r'r 
~~~. ~ CR{ 68. 
_~c::.~~~. ~C:'~~~'~~r~c:' f~"~ 68. 
~Cij'~C:''l~' nqq: 29. 
~~'~'~Cij''l~'~' ~~fcffi(: 66. 
_~. ~~ 71. v. CijIlt'5; 81. v. Cijc:.~~. 
-m' ~~: 71. 
~ 81. sine. Tib. 
